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1 Introduction
Job training programs are the core of active labor market policy in most advanced
countries. They aim at integrating the jobless and economically disadvantaged into
the labor market. Countries like the US and Germany have been operating training
policies for many decades. Yet the success of dierent approaches  in particular,
human capital development as opposed to work-rst strategies  remains a contro-
versial issue. Long-term, human capital intensive training schemes provide compre-
hensive instruction in occupational skills. While they focus on improvement in the
productivity of the unemployed, they usually do not aim at rapid reemployment.
Moreover, they are relatively expensive. In contrast, job search assistance programs
comprise job readiness training and instruction in job search skills. They are based
on the idea that occupational skills are best acquired on the job. Consequently,
they focus on quick job entry. A major advantage is their low cost. This approach
has been emphasized in policy reforms implemented in 1996 in the US and the late
1990s to early 2000s in other advanced countries.1 However, the limited set of skills
provided may not be sucient to address structural mismatch and to improve em-
ployment stability in the long run, a compelling concern in view of sweeping shifts
of labor demand that disadvantage less-skilled workers.2 After the sharp downturn
of the 2008/2009 recession, many economists call for an expansion of public spon-
sored training programs to combat increasing rates of long-term joblessness among
less-skilled persons.3
What is the best design of job training for the unemployed and the economically dis-
advantaged? This paper sets out to investigate how precisely short-term, job-search
oriented training and long-term, human capital intensive training programs work.
We examine and compare their eects on time until job entry, stability of employ-
ment, and earnings within a unied framework. For this purpose, we model the full
path of transitions between dierent labor market states and training programs over
time. Our dynamic approach has several important advantages over conventional
static research designs. First, we are able to net out dierential changes in the com-
position of treatment and comparison group persons over time. This is necessary
in order to separately assess the impacts of training on unemployment and employ-
1See e.g. Blank (2002), European Commission (2002), OECD (2005, ch. 4; 2006) and section
B.2 in the Online Appendix.
2See e.g. Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor et al. (2008), Dustmann et al. (2009) and Spitz-
Oener (2006) for evidence on long-term shifts in the structure of wages and employment especially
in the US and Germany.
3See e.g. Elsby et al. (2010) and the accompanying comments as well as the article America's
Jobless Men  Decline of the Working Man in The Economist, April 28, 2011.
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ment spells and to obtain impact estimates on employment stability and wages that
are not biased by systematic dierences between treated and comparison persons
who take up a job. Second, we are able to exactly align treated and comparison
persons with respect to their prior unemployment experience and calendar time.4
Thus, we avoid that e.g. dierences in labor market conditions upon reemployment
confound employment impacts of training. Third, our continuous-time framework
avoids specication issues that arise as a consequence of aggregating along the time
dimension.
A dynamic approach is also necessary because in many countries with comprehensive
active labor market policies, like in our case of Germany, program assignment is
not a static, one-time event. Rather, it is a recurring decision that is dynamically
related to the success of job search. Job-seekers with longer unemployment spells
are more likely to end up receiving treatment because they have been exposed to the
assignment process for a longer period of time.5 We therefore explicitly specify the
accumulation of information over time and model the dynamic process of treatment
assignment jointly with the transitions between labor market states. This strategy
allows us, in addition, to analyze of the eect of the timing of program participation
during unemployment  an important dimension of eect heterogeneity that has
been neglected in the literature so far.
Further, we investigate the heterogeneity of treatment eects not only according
to the timing of training during unemployment but also across dierent subgroups
of participants. In particular, we examine how dierent occupational groups fare
with the two training programs. This allows us to address the question whether job
training programs are an eective tool to mitigate the negative eects of structural
labor demand shifts. We give a detailed picture of the dynamics of training impacts,
provide summary statistics of overall impacts, e.g. in terms of mean and median
outcomes, and conduct a cost-benet assessment. We thus provide an exceptionally
detailed account of these two widely used active labor market programs. Such
evidence is important in order to optimally allocate existing training programs and
to devise new, improved schemes.
4Ashenfelter (1978), Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), and Heckman and Smith (1999),
among others, stress the importance to carefully align treated and comparison persons with respect
to their pre-treatment outcomes.
5See Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) for a formal analysis of dynamic program starts. A
similar situation arises if there is a delay between the moment of (random) assignment and program
start. Some persons may drop out of the treatment group before the start of the intervention
because they already found a job on their own, see Heckman et al. (1999) for evidence of substantial
dropout rates in major US social experiments. Abbring and van den Berg (2005) formally analyze
the value of randomization at some baseline point if actual enrolment in treatment is dispersed
over time.
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To provide the conceptual backdrop for our empirical analysis, we introduce a novel
dynamic potential outcome framework based on the theory of continuous-time count-
ing processes. We formally describe the dynamic relationship between treatment
times, potential and actual outcome times based on the notions of past, present,
and future. We formulate the assumptions needed to solve the evaluation problem
in a dynamic setup in which the conditioning events are sequentially updated over
time. We then develop our dynamic causal model as a semi-Markov process for the
transitions between the dierent labor market states and training programs. In this
way, we are able to extend the timing-of-events approach by Abbring and van den
Berg (2003a) to a setting that involves sequential updating of information, multiple
treatments (short-term and long-term training), multiple outcomes (unemployment
duration, employment duration, and earnings), and treatment eects that depend in
a general way on the past unemployment experience, the treatment time, observed
covariates and unobserved heterogeneity.
Our identication strategy relies on the conditional no-anticipation and indepen-
dence assumptions as well as on results from the literature on mixed hazard rate
models. Under the conditional no-anticipation assumption, the current unemploy-
ment outlook is the same for any two potential outcomes associated with dierent
future treatment times conditional on time-constant unobservables, the elapsed un-
employment experience, and the covariate history up to the current time. Under
the conditional independence assumption, the current unemployment outlook of
potential outcomes associated with dierent treatment times are conditionally in-
dependent of treatment decisions taken up to the current time. Taken together the
two assumptions can be interpreted as conditional sequential randomization into
treatment. The combination of three factors makes them a credible basis for causal
analysis in our case. First, we focus on a homogenous sample of job-seekers with
a continuous prior employment record. Second, we exploit that the allocation of
training programs is driven by the short-term supply of training slots as well as
private information of the caseworker. Third, we adopt a exible modeling strategy
that relies on large sample sizes, repeated observations per person and a rich set of
time-constant as well as time-varying covariates.
Under conditional no-anticipation and independence, we can then study identi-
cation of the joint distributions needed for causal inference on training impacts.
Specically, we view the successive transitions from unemployment and employment
as a sequence of competing and single risks models with lagged occurrence depen-
dence and lagged duration dependence in the higher order transition rates. We
apply results from the literature on duration models with proportionate unobserved
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heterogeneity in the hazard rates, dependent competing risks and lagged duration
dependence, i.e. Abbring and van den Berg (2003b), Brinch (2007), Honoré (1993),
and Horny and Picchio (2010). Hence, our estimated treatment eects are identi-
ed semiparametrically. Our large and exceptionally informative data allow us to
dispense with some important functional form assumptions that are typically made
in the literature and to adopt a rich and exible modeling strategy. In particular,
we exploit that we observe repeated realizations per person and time-varying covari-
ates.6 Thus, we are able to overcome important limitations of existing evaluation
studies using duration methods for program evaluation.
The empirical analysis in this paper uses unique administrative data for Germany.
Germany is an interesting case to study because its recent reforms and developments
in the eld of labor market policy closely follow the recommendations formulated
in the international policy debate in the mid-1990s in view of high unemployment
levels especially in the European countries (cf. European Commission, 2002, on the
European Employment Strategy and OECD, 2006, on the OECD Jobs Strategy).
Average public spending on active labor market policies per unemployed relative
to per capita GDP in the years 2000 and 2001 is around 33% in Germany which
is at the mean across OECD countries (OECD, 2006, ch. 7).7 Traditionally, long-
term, human capital development oriented training programs dominated active labor
market policy in Germany. Since the turn of the millennium, short-term, job-search
oriented training programs have gained in importance.8
Our main ndings are as follows. Participating in short-term training reduces the
remaining time in unemployment and has moderate positive eects on subsequent
job stability. Long-term training programs initially prolong the remaining time in
unemployment. However, once the scheduled program end is reached participants
exit to employment at a much faster rate than without training. Moreover, they
benet from substantially more stable employment spells and higher earnings. Fur-
ther, our ndings point to the possibility of improving the eciency of long-term
training programs through a careful targeting. Specically, we nd that the op-
portunity cost of participating in terms of prolonged unemployment is lower for
people with lower chances to exit unemployment on their own, e.g. long-term un-
employed and low-skilled. Persons without formal education degree and persons
previously working in low- and medium-skilled manual occupations reap particu-
6With these data features, identication only relies on separability of the hazard rate in the
unobserved heterogeneity term.
7The corresponding gure is 7% for the US, and 51% for Sweden.
8See section B.2 in the Online Appendix.
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larly high gains with respect to earnings. Persons previously working in medium-
skilled analytic and interactive jobs show substantial gains in terms of employment
stability. Overall, long-term training programs are well eective in supporting the
occupational advancement of very heterogeneous groups of participants, including
those with generally weak labor market prospects. However, from a scal perspec-
tive only the low-cost short-term training schemes are cost ecient in the short
run. In light of the recent policy shifts favoring short, job-search oriented training
programs a more balanced use of both types of training seems warranted. In fact,
while the shorter programs may appeal for their cost eciency the longer programs
seem more eective in tackling structural decits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
related literature in the eld. Section 3 lays out our evaluation approach and section
4 describes the implementation. Section 5 presents our causal estimates of training
impacts, and section 6 concludes. Sections A through I in the Online Appendix
contain further information on the identication analysis, the institutional context,
the data source, descriptive evidence, the variables used in the estimation and the
estimated models.
2 Related Literature
The literature on microeconometric evaluations of job training programs has been
growing rapidly since the late 1990s as the political demand for rigorous scientic
evaluations of labor market programs increased also in the continental European
countries. Evidence reviewed in various surveys and meta-analyses e.g. by Heckman
et al. (1999), Greenberg et al. (2003), Kluve (2010), and Card et al. (2010) suggests
that human capital intensive training programs show modestly positive eects in
the medium run, with the percentage gain in employment generally exceeding that
in earnings. Job search assistance programs yield favorable employment eects in
the short run. In the following, we highlight evaluation studies that are most closely
related to ours.
We start with studies applying experimental or matching methods. The vast major-
ity of evaluation studies analyzes short- to medium-term outcomes of job training
programs, which may bias ndings towards a more favorable assessment of shorter
programs, such as job search training, compared to longer ones. A few studies in-
vestigate long-term impacts, among them Couch (1992) and Hotz et al. (2006) for
the US as well as Fitzenberger et al. (2008) and Lechner et al. (2011) for Germany.
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Their results suggest that, while positive eects of human capital intensive training
appear only with a delay, they persist over periods as long as eight or nine years.
Hotz et al. (2006) and Dyke et al. (2006) study the dierential eects of training
programs aiming at human capital development and job search assistance, respec-
tively, in the US. They nd that job search assistance programs improve employment
prospects in the short run whereas more intensive training programs initially lead
to employment and earnings losses. Over the longer term, human capital intensive
training tends to be more eective than job search assistance.
While experimental and matching estimators, that closely mimic the experimental
design, are appealing for their straightforward interpretation, they also have some
limitations. As argued above, the experimental setup is inherently static and does
not take into account the dynamics of program assignment and of labor market
outcomes.9 In order to better study the labor market dynamics associated with
program participation some researchers have used event history models to evaluate
training programs. The earlier duration literature  notably Gritz (1993), Ham and
Lalonde (1996) and Eberwein et al. (1997) for the US and Bonnal et al. (1997)
for France  focuses on modeling the dynamic selection into dierent labor mar-
ket states. While in Ham and Lalonde (1996) training is randomly assigned to a
stock sample of eligible persons, Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1997), and Eberwein
et al. (1997) jointly model transitions into program states and outcome states. This
early duration literature conceives program participation as a separate labor market
state and models treatment eects with an indicator for past program participa-
tion in subsequent transition rates. These studies nd mixed eects on subsequent
unemployment spells and mostly positive impacts on subsequent employment spells.
More recently, Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) develop an econometric framework
to jointly analyze dynamically assigned programs and the probability of survival in
a baseline state. They prove identication of dynamic treatment eects that depend
on observed covariates and either the elapsed time since treatment or unobserved
heterogeneity.10 Compared to the early duration literature the more recent timing-
9There exist a number of intermediate strategies between a fully dynamic approach and a
completely static design. Matching estimators have been adapted to account for dynamic program
assignment, see e.g. Sianesi (2004, 2008), Dyke et al. (2006), and Fitzenberger et al. (2008). Other
approaches combine matching with dynamic outcomes such as transition rates and survival times,
see e.g. Bergemann et al. (2009) and de Luna and Johansson (2009). See Abbring and Heckman
(2007), Abbring and van den Berg (2004), and Crépon et al. (2009) for a methodological overview
and comparison of dierent evaluation approaches.
10Richardson and van den Berg (2006) extend the timing-of-events approach proving identica-
tion of dynamic treatment eects that are a proportional function of time since treatment, observed
covariates and unobserved heterogeneity. Abbring (2008) develops a framework based on mixed
proportional hazard rate models that involves multiple baseline states and competing destination
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of-events approach explicitly models the dynamics of program starts. Assignment to
program and exit from the baseline state are viewed as two competing risks. If exit
from the baseline state occurs rst, the waiting time until treatment is censored.
Conversely, if assignment to treatment occurs rst, the exit rate from the baseline
state may change as a consequence of the treatment. In addition, the timing-of-
events approach highlights the importance of no-anticipation of future treatments
for identication. Our dynamic causal model is similar to that of Abbring and van
den Berg (2003a), but we use a counting process framework to describe the current
evolution of potential outcome processes with respect to past and future treatment
events. We adapt the conditional no-anticipation and independence assumptions
to a setting in which the conditioning events are sequentially updated over time.
Further, we consider multiple types of treatments and multiple outcomes as well as
treatment eects that depend in a general way on the past unemployment experience,
the treatment time, observed covariates and unobserved heterogeneity.
A small literature applies the timing-of-events approach to evaluate occupational
training (Crépon et al., 2011, for France, Lalive et al., 2008, for Switzerland, Hujer
et al., 2006b, for Germany, and Richardson and van den Berg, 2006, for Sweden) or
active job-search programs (Crépon et al., 2005, for France, Hujer et al., 2006a, for
Germany, and Weber and Hofer, 2004a, b, for Austria). The vast majority focuses
on impacts on the duration in the initial unemployment spell, only Crépon et al.
(2005) and Crépon et al. (2011) also study unemployment recurrence. The evidence
in these studies suggest that job search training reduces unemployment duration,
while more intensive training programs tend to increase it. Crépon et al. (2005)
and Crépon et al. (2011) nd that both program types have a benecial eect on
unemployment recurrence.
A major advantage of our study is its exceptionally large and informative admin-
istrative data. Thus, we can relax important functional form assumptions that are
typically made in the duration literature. We adopt a exible modeling strategy and
provide a detailed account of job-search oriented and human capital intensive train-
ing with respect to the outcomes unemployment duration, employment duration
and earnings. As a further contribution, we examine the heterogeneity of treatment
eects across a range of important observed characteristics such as education and
occupation.
states.
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3 Evaluation Approach
3.1 Dynamic Potential Outcome Framework
Consider the following setup. People can either be unemployed or employed. While
unemployed, they may be assigned to a training program. In particular, the job-
seeker and the caseworker at the local employment agency meet repeatedly during
the unemployment spell. At any such occasion, the caseworker decides whether to
assign the job-seeker to a program or to postpone participation to the future, waiting
further how job search evolves. Somebody who has not participated, say, until day
80 of his unemployment spell may still enrol later. If, however, he starts a new job
at day 81 he would not be eligible for participation anymore. Thus, a job-seeker
in open, i.e. untreated, unemployment is exposed to two risks that compete to end
open unemployment: start of a training program and start of a new job. How can
we evaluate the eect of participating in training on the duration of unemployment
in this setting?
We adopt a continuous-time version of the potential outcome approach to program
evaluation (Neyman, 1923, Roy, 1951, Rubin, 1974).11 The dierent starting times
of training during unemployment represent a continuum of mutually exclusive treat-
ments s 2 R+[f1g. s =1 corresponds to the case that training never starts. We
denote by T (s) 2 R+ the potential duration in unemployment until exit to employ-
ment that prevails if training starts at time s of unemployment.12 Let T 2 R+ be
the actual unemployment duration. For training starting at s, the actual outcome
time is identical to the potential outcome time associated with s, i.e. T  T (s),
whereas the other potential outcome times T (s0), s0 6= s, are counterfactual.
We express the random time spent in unemployment as a continuous-time stochas-
tic process. This will allow us to formally describe how past and future treatment
times aect the current unemployment outlook conditional on the information ac-
cumulated until the current period. Let u denote the elapsed time since the begin-
ning of unemployment. The actual unemployment duration T generates a count-
ing process Y  fY (u); u 2 R+g such that Y (u) = 0 if u  T and Y (u) = 1
if u > T . Analogously, we denote the counting process associated with the po-
tential unemployment duration T (s) as Y (s)  fY (s; u); u 2 R+g such that
11See Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) and Lok (2008) for related approaches in contin-
uous time. Abbring and Heckman (2007) provide an overview of dierent dynamic evaluation
approaches.
12We assume that all potential outcomes fT (s); 0  s  1g are absolutely continuous random
variables.
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Y (s; u) = 0 if u  T (s) and Y (s; u) = 1 if u > T (s).13 Further, let dY (u)
be the dierential of Y (u) in a small interval [u; u + du). Let u  denote the time
just before u. The probability that an exit to employment occurs in the small in-
terval [u; u + du) conditional on survival in unemployment until just before u is
given by Pr(dY (u) = 1jY (u ) = 0) = Pr(T 2 [u; u + du)jT  u)  (u)du,
where (u) denotes the hazard rate or intensity process. In order to model this
probability conditional on the information available up to the current period,
we introduce the ltration I(u ) that collects the information accumulated un-
til just before u. Let fx(u); u 2 R+g be a vector-valued stochastic process of
time-varying random variables and v a vector of time-constant random variables.14
While x(u) represents covariates that can be observed by both the job-seeker and
the researcher, v is not observable for the researcher. Now I(u ) is dened as
fY (r); x(r); v; 0  r < ug, where fg is the -algebra generated by the events
fY (r); x(r); v; 0  r < ug. Y has an intensity process with respect to the ltration
I(u ) if (ujI(u )) is predictable given I(u ) and, thus, the conditional expec-
tation of dY (u) equals the conditional intensity process times the increment of u:
E[dY (u)  (ujI(u ))dujI(u )] = Pr[dY (u) = 1jI(u )]  (ujI(u ))du = 0.
Our goal is to contrast the marginal distributions of potential outcome times associ-
ated with dierent treatment times. In particular, we want to evaluate the eect of
starting training at s instead of s0 for those who enrol at s. The potential outcome
distribution associated with starting training at s0 is counterfactual for those who
enrol at s. In order to solve the evaluation problem we rely on two assumptions.
As only unemployed persons are eligible for training the treatment times are cen-
sored for people who nd a job before starting training. Therefore, we assume that
conditional on the information accumulated up to just before u the probability of
an exit to employment in a small interval [u; u + du) is the same across potential
outcomes associated with dierent treatment times that lie after u. Formally, for
any two potential outcome processes Y (s) and Y (s0) that have intensity processes
with respect to the ltration I(u )  fY (r); x(r); v; 0  r < ug, we suppose that:
(Conditional No-Anticipation)(1)
Pr[dY (s; u) = 1jI(u )] = Pr[dY (s0; u) = 1jI(u )] 8 u  min(s; s0) :
Under the conditional no-anticipation assumption (1), the current probabilities of
survival in unemployment for any two potential outcome processes associated with
dierent future treatment times coincide. Hence, we can study the distribution
13We assume that all counting processes are right-continuous and have limits on the left.
14We suppose that the process fx(u); 0  ug is left continuous and that v is bounded.
9
of the observed unemployment process given that training has not yet started to
recover the potential unemployment process without training (s =1).15
Second, we assume that conditional on the history of information available just
before u the potential outcome processes are independent of the treatment history
up to u. Formally, the random waiting time in unemployment until the start of
training induces a counting process D  fD(u); u 2 R+ [1g such that D(u) = 0
if u is smaller or equal to the treatment time and D(u) = 1 else. Denote the -
algebra generated by the treatment process as fD(r); 0  r < ug. We suppose
that the potential outcome process Y (s) has an I(u )-predictable intensity process
that is also the intensity process of Y (s) with respect to the extended ltration
J (u )  I(u ) [ fD(r); 0  r < ug, i.e.:
(Conditional Independence)(2)
Pr[dY (s; u) = 1jJ (u )] = Pr[dY (s; u) = 1jI(u )] 8 s :
While assumption (1) characterizes the evolution of current potential outcomes asso-
ciated with future treatment times, assumption (2) refers to the relationship between
current potential outcomes and past treatment events. Taken together the two as-
sumptions can be interpreted as sequential randomization into treatment conditional
on the information available up to the time of randomization. They are compara-
ble to sequential conditional unconfoundedness assumptions invoked in sequential
matching approaches (e.g. Lok, 2008, Robins, 1998, Sianesi, 2004), except that we
allow the conditioning set to include time-constant unobservables. Importantly, as-
sumptions (1) and (2) do not rule out that job-seekers can in general predict the
probability of receiving training at particular points in time. Moreover, their pre-
dictions may be based on information acquired during the course of unemployment.
Assumptions (1) and (2) just require that the researcher can control for all events
that jointly predict treatment and outcome times. In addition, after conditioning
on all relevant information, treatment assignment still needs to be a stochastic pro-
cess.16 In section 3.3, we substantiate the empirical support of assumptions (1) and
(2) in our application.
15Without the conditional no-anticipation assumption, we could only identify the average of
pre-treatment potential outcomes with respect to the distribution of future starting dates.
16Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) also rely on versions of the conditional no-anticipation
and independence assumptions. Translated into our notation, their no-anticipation assump-
tion states that Pr[dY (s; u) = 1jH(u )] = Pr[dY (s0; u) = 1jH(u )] 8u  min(s; s0), where
H(u )  fY (r); 0  r < u; x(0); vg. Thus, they abstract from the possibility that the current
transition probabilities of potential outcomes associated with dierent future treatment times de-
pend dierentially on events occurring between the start of unemployment and the current period.
Translated into our notation, their conditional independence assumption states that the potential
outcome processes, fY (s); s 2 R+[1g, are independent of the treatment process,D, conditional
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By assumptions (1) and (2) we can link the potential probability of an exit to
employment at time u to the actually observed probability:
Pr[dY (s; u) = 1jI(u )] = Pr[dY (s; u) = 1jJ (u )] = Pr[dY (u) = 1jJ (u )] :
Thus, we can conduct inference on the potential unemployment processes associated
with dierent treatment times by studying the properties of the actually observed
unemployment processes conditional on the respective treatment times. Further, we
can express the actual outcome process and the treatment process as three under-
lying processes that are independent conditional on J (u ). The rst component
process tracks the transition from open unemployment to employment, the second
the transition from open unemployment to treatment and the third the transition
from treated unemployment to employment. Thus, the waiting times in open unem-
ployment until the start of training and until exit to employment are two competing
risks. Identication of the joint distribution of the waiting times is nontrivial be-
cause we allow all three to depend on the unobserved heterogeneity v. We rely
on results from the literature on mixed hazard rate and competing risks models.
We describe the full model, that includes two types of training programs, and its
identication in section 3.2.
Further, we want to study the impact of training on the stability of subsequent
employment. We extend our framework as follows. Let K(u) be the state occupied
at time u since inow into unemployment. K(u) = U if unemployed and K(u) = E
if employed at time u. The transition from origin state k to destination state l,
can be modeled as a continuous-time semi-Markov process. Analogously to above,
let Tkl 2 R+ denote the random time spent in state k until exit to state l and
Y kl the corresponding counting process that tracks the transition from state k to
state l. Similarly, Y kl(s) denotes the potential outcome process for the transition
from state k to l prevailing if training starts at time s of unemployment. The
probability that a transition from k to l occurs in a small interval [u; u+du) is given
by Pr[dYkl(u) = 1jYkl(u ) = 0; K(u ) = k] = Pr[K(u+du) = ljTkl  t;K(u ) = k],
where t is the elapsed duration in the current state k.
With some small modications, assumptions (1) and (2) carry over to the ex-
tended setup. In both equations, substitute Y kl for Y
. The ltrations are
now dened as I(u )  fYkl(r); x(r); v; 0  r < u; k; l 2 fE;Ug; k 6= lg and
J (u )  fYkl(r); D(min(r; TUE)); x(r); v; 0  r < u; k; l 2 fE;Ug; k 6= lg. Fur-
ther, we assume that the conditional no-anticipation assumption (1) holds for all
on the information available at time zero, I(0)  fx(0); vg. This assumption abstracts from the
possibility that events occurring during the course of unemployment may jointly inuence potential
outcome times and treatment times.
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u  min(s; s0) if K(u) = U and for all s; s0 > TUE if K(u) = E. Thus, the survival
experience is the same for potential employment processes associated with dierent
treatment times that have not been realized during the preceding unemployment
spell. Under assumptions (1) and (2), we can recover the potential employment
processes associated with dierent treatment times from the actual employment
process conditional on the respective treatment times. Hence, we view our dynamic
causal model as a semi-Markov process that involves a competing risks model for
the waiting times in open unemployment until exit to employment and training and
single risk models for the transitions from treated unemployment to employment as
well as from treated and nontreated employment to unemployment. In addition, we
consider a second model with earnings instead of employment duration. In this case,
we model the conditional distribution of earnings as a hazard rate together with the
hazard rates from unemployment into training and into employment.17 We describe
our setup and the identication in detail in the next section.
3.2 Identication with Proportionate Unobserved Hetero-
geneity
We now describe our empirical setup, that comprises two treatments, i.e. short-term
training and long-term training, and two outcomes, i.e. the duration until reemploy-
ment and the duration of subsequent employment or the level of subsequent earnings
in terms of a continuous-time semi-Markov process. We then discuss identication
of our model based on results from the literature on mixed hazard rate models with
proportionate unobserved heterogeneity.
Consider an inow sample into the initial state open unemployment O. A person in
the initial state may exit to any of the three states (i) unemployment treated with
short-term training S, (ii) unemployment treated with long-term training L, or (iii)
employment E. A person in state S may exit to the destinations L or E. A person
in state L may move to state E.18 We call one such sequence of transitions from
unemployment to employment a cycle. In the model with employment duration as
the second outcome we also model the transition from employment, E, back to open
unemployment, O, and consider repeated cycles per individual. In the alternative
17Donald et al. (2000) also use a hazard rate model to investigate dierences between the US
and Canadian conditional wage distributions.
18If short-term training is the rst intervention we allow for a second treatment with long-term
training because short-term training is also used to assess the professional skills of an unemployed
and to dene a suitable reintegration plan, which may entail a later participation in a long-term
training program.
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model with earnings as the second outcome, we use just the rst cycle for every
individual.19 Figure 1 illustrates the possible pathways from open unemployment to
employment.
Figure 1: Number of Observations at Dierent Phases of the Unemployment-
Employment Cycle
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Notes: O;S; L;E denote the labor market states open unemployment, unemployment treated with
short-term training, unemployment treated with long-term training and employment, respectively.
The states in parentheses indicate dependence of current states on the past trajectory. The rst
number in each box refers to the number of observations using repeated cycles per person, the
second number (in italics) to the number of observations using only the rst cycle.
More formally, let K = fO;S; L;Eg denote the state space. The function Z(k)
assigns to each origin state k 2 K a set of possible destination states:
Z(k) =
8>><>>:
fS; L;Eg if k = O
fL;Eg if k = S
fEg if k = L
fOg if k = E :
For k 2 fO; Sg, the number of elements in Z(k) is greater than one, jZ(k)j > 1.
Thus, we view a cycle as a sequence of competing risks and single risk models.
According to the Markov assumption, the probability to experience a transition from
current state k to destination state l only depends on the current state k occupied.
In order to dierentiate e.g. between employment spells following a participation in
training as opposed to open unemployment (cf. gure 1), we dene the augmented
state space Ka = fO; S(O); L(O); E(O); L(S); E(S); E(S; L)g, where the states in
19Due to the reporting rules of the employment register we cannot model transitions into and
out of employment at the same time as earnings, see section 4.2.
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parentheses indicate the past trajectory. We denote the corresponding function of
destination states from k 2 Ka by Za(k). We model dependence on the past tra-
jectory as lagged occurrence dependence and lagged duration dependence. With
this extension we can align treated and comparison persons with respect to their
unemployment experience since the beginning of the cycle. In particular, when es-
timating training impacts on the transition rate to employment we align treated
and comparison persons in their total elapsed unemployment duration, that is for
the treated the prior duration in open unemployment plus the current duration in
treated unemployment. Similarly, when measuring training impacts on the transi-
tion rate from employment back to unemployment we condition on the total prior
unemployment duration.
Let Tkl 2 R+ denote the random time spent in state k before exiting to state l,
k 2 Ka, l 2 Za(k) and t the elapsed duration in state k. For origin states with
multiple destinations we do not observe the realizations of all exit times from state
k but just that of the minimum. Let x(t) denote the covariate process just before
time t, x(t)  fx(r); 0  r < tg the covariate path on [0; t) and X its support. We
can express the conditional distribution of Tkl, k 2 Ka, l 2 Za(k)g, in terms of the
hazard rate:
kl(tj; x(t); vkl)  lim
dt!0
Pr [t  Tkl < t+ dtjTkl  t; ; x(t); vkl]
dt
(3)
= kl [t;1(k 6= O); x(t)] vkl ;
where vkl 2 R+ is an unobserved heterogeneity term while kl() : (R+R+X)!
R+ denotes the part of the hazard that is a function of observed factors, i.e. elapsed
time in the current state t, observed covariates x(t) and lagged duration  that
enters the transition rate if origin state k 6= O.
Our goal is to identify the single components of the hazard rates kl() and the
joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, G(v), v = fvkl : k 2
Ka; l 2 Za(k)g, which then yields the joint distribution of the durations fTkl : k 2
Ka; l 2 Za(k)g. We proceed in a sequential way, considering rst identication of the
competing risks from the initial state, then of the hazard rates from the second state
given the rst transition and so on. In this way we identify, for a given origin state
k, the joint distribution of the unobservables fvkl : l 2 Za(k)g together with the
selection process into state k. Once we have identied all possible trajectories leading
from open unemployment to employment, we can trace out the joint distribution of
the unobservables fvkl : k 2 Ka; l 2 Za(k)g by varying the observed arguments of
the hazard rates (i.e. t; ; x(t)) on a nonempty open set. This yields then the joint
distribution of the survival times fTkl : k 2 Ka; l 2 Za(k)g.
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We describe the exact procedure and the identication results used at each stage of
the unemployment-employment cycle in section A in the Online Appendix. Here,
we summarize the main points. In our model with employment duration as the sec-
ond outcome, our identication strategy exploits that we observe about half of the
sample more than once in the initial state and that the hazard rates from treated
unemployment and employment include time-varying covariates.20 This allows us
to avoid several restrictive assumptions, e.g. proportionality of the eects of elapsed
duration, lagged duration and observed covariates, that are commonly made in the
literature on mixed hazard rate models (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b, Propo-
sition 3; Brinch, 2007). As suggested in equation (3), we only assume separability
of the unobserved heterogeneity terms.
In our alternative model with earnings, we model the conditional distribution of
earnings as a hazard rate together with the hazard rates from unemployment into
employment, short-term training, and long-term training. In this model, we do not
have repeated cycles per person and the hazard rates of daily earnings do not in-
clude covariates that vary with the level of earnings. Therefore, we assume that the
hazard rates are separable in their components, a exible nonnegative function of
elapsed duration, 0kl(t), of lagged duration, kl(1(k 6= O)), of observed covariates,
kl(x(t)), and unobserved heterogeneity, vkl, i.e. kl(tj; x(t); vkl) = 0kl(t)kl(1(k 6=
O))kl(x(t))vkl, and that the regressors are independent of the unobserved het-
erogeneity terms (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b, Proposition 2; Honoré, 1993,
Theorem 3; Horny and Picchio, 2010).
3.3 Empirical Support of the Conditional No-Anticipation
and Independence Assumptions
The conditional no-anticipation assumption (1) and the conditional independence
assumption (2) are important prerequisites for identication. Analogously to a static
matching analysis their plausibility depends on the richness of our data and our abil-
ity to exibly control for potentially time-varying confounders that jointly determine
outcome and treatment times. We can to some extent dispense with time-constant
observed covariates through including unobserved heterogeneity. The combination
20In the hazard rates from unemployment we use time-varying regressors related to the remaining
entitlement period of unemployment benets, age, and season of the year. In the hazard rates
from treated unemployment, we include in addition indicators for dierent time intervals relative
to the planned end of the program. In the employment hazards, we consider a polynomial of age
(interacted with gender), indicators for season of the year and interactions between season and
industry of the last job.
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of three factors makes the conditional no-anticipation assumption a credible basis
for causal analysis in our case: (i) our construction of the analysis sample, (ii) the
institutional setup determining training participation, and (iii) our exible modeling
strategy based on large and informative data.
First, we construct our analysis sample in such a way that included individuals
have similar recent employment histories and high incentives to comply with the
instructions of the caseworker. According to the regulation of public employment
services in Germany, job-seekers face tight job search requirements (section B.1 in
the Online Appendix). Therefore, we focus on prime-age workers who experience a
transition into unemployment after a period of continuous employment. We refrain
from including individuals who start looking for a job after a period out of the labor
force because they might only register at the local employment agency so long as
their expected utility from receiving particular services and programs exceeds their
disutility associated with tight job search requirements. As a consequence more than
90% of the persons in our sample have substantial entitlements to unemployment
benets (section D.3 in the Online Appendix). These individuals are presumably
highly committed to cooperate with the local employment agency, for intrinsic rea-
sons as well as for the fact that in case of noncompliance their generous benets
would be at risk. Overall, these sample selection criteria ensure that the individuals
considered in the analysis behave in a relatively predictable way and according to
the guidelines set out by public employment services.
Second, with respect to the assignment of training programs, a participation in train-
ing may take place at any point in time during the unemployment spell. Job-seekers
have no entitlements regarding participation (section B.1). However, a program
assignment is compulsory for the job-seeker and noncompliance may entail bene-
t sanctions and the exclusion from further services. The allocation of training
programs depends on the short-term supply of training slots as well as private in-
formation of the caseworker. On the one hand short notice periods and belated
assignments (i.e. after the ocial starting date of a program) are used as a work
test. On the other hand they allow caseworkers to achieve a high utilization of avail-
able training capacities and at the same time to avoid disincentives for job-seekers
anticipating future program participation. As caseworkers face a very high caseload
the assignment is not targeted.21 As supporting evidence for this practice, we nd
considerable variation in the timing of training starts during the unemployment
21The average caseload in terms of registered unemployed is about 400 unemployed per case-
worker (section B.1). In addition, caseworkers counsel people who register as job-seekers but are
not unemployed as well as people who do not register in the end.
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spell and modest dierences in key observed characteristics between participants
and nonparticipants (sections D.2 and D.3). Anticipatory eects with regard to
future training participation are therefore unlikely to occur.
The third important ingredient for conditional no-anticipation and independence is
the data and the specication of the conditional hazard rates. Our administrative
database is exceptionally rich with regard to the number of observations as well
as the available covariate information. Large sample sizes allow us to condition on
current and lagged duration, calendar time, observed covariates and unobserved het-
erogeneity in a detailed and exible way (see also section 4.3). For instance, we use
step functions to model duration dependence, which allows us to nonparametrically
approximate arbitrary patterns of duration dependence. We model the impacts of
training on the exit rate out of unemployment with a step function indicating dif-
ferent time intervals relative to the planned end of the program. In addition, we
exibly condition on calendar time at the start of the spell, current season of the
year, and age of the individual. A careful specication of duration and calendar
time eects is important to capture changes in the job-seeker's information set that
are a function of time.
In terms of covariates, we have access to the information collected on job-seekers
when they register at the local employment agency, i.e. the Supply of Applicants
database. It builds the basis for the counseling activities and assignment decisions
of the caseworker. It details personal characteristics, properties of the last job, and
objectives of job-search. The data also include caseworker assessments of the qual-
ications and experience of a job-seeker and of his/her health status. Combining
this with the employment register we can characterize the last employment relation-
ship in terms of e.g. previous earnings, occupation, industry, type of position, and
the reason why the job ended. In addition, we control for region of residence and
local labor market conditions. We include time-varying indicators for the remaining
benet entitlement, past and current periods of sickness as well as past and current
temporary suspensions of benet payments.22
22See section E in the Online Appendix for a detailed description of the included variables.
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4 Implementation
4.1 Training Programs Analyzed
Training schemes are the core of active labor market policy in Germany as in most
advanced countries.23 In our analysis, we focus on human capital intensive long-
term training on the one hand and job-search oriented short-term training on the
other hand.
Long-term training schemes comprise a variety of programs ranging from advanced
vocational training and refresher courses on specic professional skills and opera-
tional techniques to comprehensive retraining in a new vocational degree within the
German apprenticeship system. The former typically last between six and twelve
months whereas retraining takes two to three years. Training programs may take
place either in classrooms, simulated workplaces, rms or a combination thereof.
Typical examples of long-term training programs include training on marketing and
sales strategies, computer assisted bookkeeping, operating construction machines,
and specialist courses in specic legal elds.
Short-term training courses last a couple of days to twelve weeks. Similar to the
long-term training schemes, they may take place in classrooms or workplace-like
environments. However, due to their shorter length their contents are less occupation
specic and the human capital component is limited. Typical examples of short-term
training schemes include job application training, basic computer courses, language
courses and short-term internships at a simulated or real workplace. Their aim is
twofold. On the one hand, they provide skills that improve and facilitate job search.
On the other hand, they are employed to assess a job-seeker's abilities and his/her
readiness to work or to participate in a further program.
4.2 Data
The empirical analysis is based on an exceptionally rich administrative database, the
Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS), that has recently been made
available by the Research Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency.
The IEBS is a 2.2% random sample from a merged data le containing individual
records out of four dierent administrative registers. It comprises data on employ-
23See section B.2 in the Online Appendix for further information on the quantitative importance
of training in the context of German active labor market policy.
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ment subject to social security contributions, receipt of transfer payments during
unemployment, job search, and participation in dierent active labor market pro-
grams. Start and end dates of the dierent labor market episodes are measured with
daily precision.
From this data set, we extract a sample of West Germans aged 25 to 53 who ex-
perience a transition from regular, unsubsidized employment lasting three months
or longer to unemployment within the period July 1999 to December 2001. Un-
employment is dened as nonemployment with at least occasional contact with the
employment agency. This contact may be recorded in the data either as a benet
spell, a registered job search spell, or a period of program participation.24 Unem-
ployment spells are censored at the end date of the last contact with the employment
agency if in the following three months no such contact persists. Nonemployment
spells without any contact with the employment oce are not considered because
in that case we cannot distinguish between people looking for a job and persons
out of the labor force. Also, people who are not actively looking for a job or who
do not register with the employment agency are not eligible for training programs.
Transitions to active labor market programs other than training are treated as in-
dependent censoring. We follow the persons in the inow sample until the end of
December 2004, and ongoing spells are censored at that date. We model the trajec-
tory from open unemployment to employment, which may include a participation
short-term training or long-term training. In addition, we consider the transition
from employment back to unemployment. Individuals in the sample may have mul-
tiple unemployment and employment spells if they experience multiple transitions
between unemployment and employment.
In the alternative model with earnings, we model the pathway from open unemploy-
ment to employment and the average earnings per calendar day within the rst 365
days upon reemployment. Days during which a person is not employed contribute
with a zero. Earnings are censored at the social security threshold and if the time
between the end of unemployment and the end of our observation period is less
than 365 days. In the model with earnings, we use only the rst cycle for every
individual because we cannot measure earnings dynamics at the same frequency as
employment dynamics. Total earnings are reported only once every calendar year
in employment relationships that last longer than a year. We model the conditional
density of daily earnings in the same way as the transition rates into dierent labor
market states, i.e. using a mixed proportional hazard rate specication.
24For 12 out of 13,859 training spells, the training spell constitutes the rst contact with the
employment agency recorded in the data.
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Figure 1 above illustrates the dierent transitions of the 45,459 people in our sam-
ple. In total, there are 87,250 unemployment spells, of which 8,279 (5,580) lead
to a participation in short-term training (long-term training), and there are 56,758
employment spells. About half of the individuals in the sample experience multi-
ple unemployment spells and about 30% have more than one employment spell. In
contrast, only 8% (2%) of the treated with short-term training (long-term training)
participate more than once in the same program.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the distributions of unemployment and em-
ployment durations as well as wages, by treatment status and for the entire sample.
The means in table 1 refer to the expected value conditional on the truncated dis-
tribution of T until truncation point t > 0.25 It is calculated as follows:
(4) E[T jT  t] =
R t
0
rdF (r)
F (t)
=
R t
0
S(r)dr   tS(t)
1  S(t) ;
where F (t) is the cumulative distribution function and S(t) the survivor function.
We estimate S(t) with the Kaplan and Meier (1958) estimator. In sum, the evidence
in table 1 suggests that long-term training has benecial eects on employment
duration but at the same time seems to strongly increase unemployment duration.
Short-term training, in contrast, tends to reduce unemployment duration but seems
to have mixed eects on employment and earnings. However, it is important to stress
that these patterns reect a mixture of causal and selection eects. It remains to
be seen to what extent they persist after taking into account the dynamic selection
into treatments and into outcome states.26
4.3 Model Specication
We adopt a piecewise constant exponential model for the hazard rates. For the
index functions, we use exible, linear in parameters specications to model the
dependence on observed covariates x(t) and lagged duration  . We use piecewise
constant specications to model the dependence on elapsed duration t and time
dependence of training impacts during unemployment. Specically, in our model
with employment, the hazard rate for the transition from state k to l is given by:
kl(tj; x(t); vkl) = kl [t;1(k 6= O); x(t)] vkl
= exp[hkl(t;1(k 6= O); x(t))kl] vkl ;
25We choose the truncation points for unemployment and employment duration according to the
limits of our observation period and for daily earnings according to the social security threshold
in 2000.
26Sections C, D, and E in the Online Appendix provide further details on the administrative data
base, additional descriptive evidence and a complete list of the covariates used in the estimations.
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Table 1: Unemployment and Employment Outcomes by Treatment Status
Unemployment Employment Earnings
E(T jT  1825) Median E(T jT  1825) Median E(T jT  144) Median
No training 219 160 375 284 49.87 49.25
Short training 235 172 361 304 45.08 43.29
Long training 570 607 477 506 50.16 50.13
All 261 167 380 287 49.56 48.87
Observations 87,250 56,758 30,190
Notes: Unemployment and employment durations are measured in days, daily earnings in e (real
values, reference year 2000).
where hkl() is a function of the observed components elapsed time t, lagged duration
 (that enters the hazard rate if state k 6= O) and observed covariates x(t), and kl
is a conformable coecient vector. In our alternative model with earnings, the
hazard rate for the transition from state k to l is modeled as kl(tj; x(t); vkl) =
exp[bkl(t)kl + dkl(1(k 6= O))kl + fkl(x(t))kl] vkl, with b(), d(), f() some exible
functions and , ,  conformable coecient vectors.
We model the joint distribution of the unobservables, fvkl : k 2 Ka, l 2 Za(k)g, with
a discrete masspoint distribution that in principle allows to approximate any arbi-
trary discrete or continuous distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). In particular,
we adopt a factor loading specication with two independent underlying factors, w1
and w2:
vkl = exp(kl1w1 + kl2w2); k 2 Ka; l 2 Za(k)g ;
where kl1 and kl2 denote the factor loadings on the fundamental unobserved factors
w1 and w2, respectively, for a transition from state k to l. We normalize w1 and w2
to have support f 1; 1g and in addition constrain one of the kl2 to equal zero.27
The two-dimensional factor loading model imposes no restrictions on the covariance
matrix of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. Let w = (w1; w2)
0 and A be the
matrix of factor loadings with rows Akl = (kl1; kl2), k 2 Ka; l 2 Za(k)g. Then
the variance-covariance matrix of the unobserved heterogeneity terms is given by
Var(ln(v)) = AVar(w)A0.
In our preferred specications, each of the two factors has two masspoints. We
experimented with dierent numbers of masspoints for the latent factors. The max-
imum number that led to a signicant improvement of the log likelihood function
was three masspoints for each factor in the model with employment duration. How-
27All hazards contain an intercept.
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ever, the model t in terms of a comparison between the original and simulated
duration distributions diered only marginally from that based on two masspoints
for each factor. Importantly, the model with two masspoints for each factor is com-
putationally more attractive. Since we normalize the locations of the masspoints we
can avoid evaluation of their derivatives. This speeds up computation by a factor of
two to four, which is important when it comes to bootstrapping standard errors.
4.4 Estimation
Conditional on the observed covariates and the unobserved determinants, the joint
density of the four durations for individual i is given by:
fi =
NiY
j=1
PijY
p=1
p(tijpjijp; xij(tijp); vip)cijp exp[ 
Z tijp
0
p(rjijp; xij(r); vip)dr] ;
whereNi is the number of cycles of person i, Pij is the total number of possible origin-
destination state pairs associated with person i's jth cycle, and cijp is a censoring
indicator that equals one if the observation period of person i in cycle j ends with
a transition from the origin state to the destination state indexed by p. p() is the
hazard rate that depends on elapsed duration in the current state t, lagged duration
 , observed covariates x(t) and unobserved heterogeneity v. Since we allow for
nonzero correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the dierent hazard
rates, the likelihood function is not separable by individual and spell type. Thus, the
individual likelihood contribution conditional on observed covariates and integrated
over the vector of unobserved heterogeneity terms, v, is:
Li =
Z
  
Z NiY
j=1
PijY
p=1
p(tijpjijp; xij(tijp); vip)cijp 
exp

 
Z tijp
0
p(rijpjijp; xij(rijp); vip)dr

dG(v) :
The nal models involve the estimation of more than 350 and 500 parameters, respec-
tively. The maximization routine uses a Newton-Raphson algorithm with analytic
rst and second derivatives.28 To obtain standard errors, we implement the semi-
parametric bootstrap procedure suggested in Gaure et al. (2010). For the coecients
on the observed covariates we draw values from their joint normal distribution.29
28The maximum likelihood evaluator is implemented in Stata MP Version 11.1 and its matrix
language Mata.
29Van der Vaart (1996) shows that, in the exponential hazard model with nonparametric unob-
served heterogeneity, the coecients attached to observed covariates are asymptotically normal.
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Based on these draws we estimate a constrained model keeping the coecients on
the observed covariates xed and maximizing over the coecients associated with
the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. We perform 250 bootstrap replications.30
The full estimation results and the simulated model t are displayed in sections F
and G in the Online Appendix.
5 Causal Estimates of Training Impacts
5.1 Impacts of Training on the Treated
We use the parameter estimates to simulate the marginal distributions of treatment
and nontreatment outcomes in the sample of treated persons. In particular, we
consider all persons who receive training within the rst 731 days of their rst un-
employment spell.31 We exclude later training starts in order to avoid extrapolations
beyond the time horizon of our data. We simulate ten unemployment-employment
cycles for each person and treatment status.32 From the simulated durations, we es-
timate the marginal distributions of treatment and nontreatment outcomes with the
Kaplan and Meier (1958) estimator. We further assess training impacts through con-
trasting summary statistics of the marginal distributions, e.g. the truncated mean
given in eq. (4). We compute standard errors for the summary statistics by re-
running the simulation procedure 250 times using the parameter values from the
bootstrap replications.33
Our data includes information on the planned and actually realized end dates of
training programs. The planned enrolment length is assigned at the start of the
program and may be shorter or longer than the realized duration.34 We model
duration dependence of treatment eects with dummy variables indicating dierent
time intervals relative to the planned program end. This allows us to contrast
in-program eects with post-program eects of training. Thus, we consider two
30We use the bootstrap distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters to test them
for normality. The tests suggest no deviation from normality for 16 out of 17 parameters in model
1 (employment) and 7-9 parameters out of 13 in model 2 (earnings as second outcome).
31We obtain a subsample 7,046 of treated persons, 3,489 of which participate in short-term
training and 3,557 in long-term training.
32Further details are provided in section H in the Online Appendix.
33As the summary statistics on training impacts are smooth functionals of the survivor function
we treat them as normal distributed when conducting hypothesis tests.
34Waller (2009) reports that about 20% of the persons who attend a training program for more
than one week drop out early, i.e. before completing 80% of the scheduled enrolment length.
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measures for the impact of training on unemployment: the eect on the remaining
time counted from the start of training and from the planned end of training. Panels
(a) and (b) of gure 2 depict the simulated hazard rates with and without training
from the program start onwards, panels (c) and (d) show the hazard rates starting
from the planned program end.
Figure 2: Impacts of Training on the Hazard Rate out of Unemployment
Hazard Rate out of Unemployment from Program Start
(a) Short-Term Training (b) Long-Term Training
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Hazard Rate out of Unemployment from Planned Program End
(c) Short-Term Training (d) Long-Term Training
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the hazard rates are based on simulated unemployment
durations with and without training for a subset of the originally treated persons, cf. p. 23. The
bandwidth for the kernel smooth of the hazard rates is 30 days. Estimates within 30 days of the
left boundary are omitted.
Panel (a) of gure 2 shows that participants in short-term training exit at a faster
rate, compared to the situation without training, already from the beginning of
the program onwards. Thus, a participation in short-term training, that has a
median planned duration of four weeks, has no noticeable lock-in eect. To the
contrary, it immediately helps participants in getting reemployed. The eect reaches
its maximum about 65 days after program start. At that date, the hazard rate with
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short-term training is 18% higher than that without training. However, it then fades
away relatively quickly. According to panel (c) of gure 2, the dierence between
the hazard rates with and without training is already very small three months after
the planned program end.
The picture is rather dierent for long-term training programs that have a me-
dian planned duration of 201 days. In panel (b) of gure 2, we see that, during
participation, people exit unemployment at a much lower rate compared to the sit-
uation of nonparticipation. Only after somewhat more than 200 days since program
start, when the majority has completed training, the hazard rate recovers to a level
slightly exceeding the one without participation. However, once we concentrate on
the period following the scheduled program end, in panel (d) of gure 2, we see that
long-term training has strong and persistent positive eects on the exit rate to em-
ployment. During the rst three months after the planned program end, the hazard
rate out of unemployment is about twice as high for the participants compared to
the situation had they not participated. This eect slowly declines over time. One
year after the planned program end, the hazard rate with participation in long-term
training is about 40% higher than without training.
Table 2 provides summary statistics and bootstrapped standard errors on the im-
pacts of short-term and long-term training on the remaining time in unemployment.
In each table, the row labeled `NTO' refers to the simulated nontreatment outcome
and the row labeled `TT' to the simulated treatment eect on the treated. The
columns labeled `E[T jT  731]' and `E[T jT  365]' refer to the truncated means
that are calculated according to eq. 4, now for the remaining time in unemployment
until 731 days after the start of training and 365 days after the planned end, respec-
tively. Counting from the program start, we see that short-term training reduces
the expected remaining time in unemployment by a statistically signicant 16 days,
about 8.6%, whereas participating in long-term training signicantly increases it by
95 days or 50.6%. Considering the time from the planned program end onwards,
we see that long-term training has a stronger benecial eect than short-term train-
ing: the latter reduces the average remaining duration in unemployment by 11 days
(9.0%) whereas the reduction achieved with long-term training is 25 days (17.4%).
Figure 3 displays the simulated impacts of training on the probability to stay em-
ployed beyond a given elapsed duration. For both training programs the probability
to remain employed is higher with training than without at longer elapsed durations.
The vertical dierence between the survivors with and without training increases up
to about 1.5 years after the beginning of the employment spell and remains con-
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Table 2: Nontreatment Outcomes (NTO) and Treatment Eects on the Treated
(TT) for Remaining Unemployment Duration
(a) Remaining Time in Unemployment from Program Start
E(T jT  731) Pr(T > 731) P15 P30 P45
Short-term training
NTO 191.39 (2.20) 0.39 (0.01) 54 (1.44) 122 (4.01) 264 (11.39)
TT -16.37 (4.02) -0.04 (0.02) -7 (2.83) -21 (6.99) -59 (21.02)
Long-term training
NTO 187.68 (1.81) 0.35 (0.01) 46 (1.24) 106 (2.92) 225 (8.52)
TT 95.01 (4.19) 0.08 (0.03) 97 (8.61) 154 (15.19) 211 (37.66)
(b) Remaining Time in Unemployment from Planned Program End
E(T jT  365) Pr(T > 365) P15 P30 P45
Short-term training
NTO 121.54 (0.84) 0.53 (0.01) 55 (1.52) 135 (4.65) 320 (14.00)
TT -10.84 (1.57) -0.06 (0.02) -23 (3.12) -35 (8.81) -94 (24.89)
Long-term training
NTO 143.64 (1.41) 0.69 (0.01) 118 (4.29) 332 (13.37) 
TT -24.54 (2.97) -0.17 (0.03) -69 (6.13) -201 (19.35) 
Notes: Unemployment durations are measured in days. P15, P30, P45 refer to the percentiles of
the cumulative distribution function. Calculations are based on simulated unemployment durations
with and without training for a subset of the originally treated persons. Bootstrapped standard
errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. ,  and  denote signicance at the 10%-, 5%-
and 1%- level, respectively.
Figure 3: Impacts of Training on the Probability of Survival in Employment
(a) Short-Term Training (b) Long-Term Training
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 s
ur
vi
va
l
0 365 730 1095 1460 1825
Days employed
No training Short training
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
of
 s
ur
vi
va
l
0 365 730 1095 1460 1825
Days employed
No training Long training
Notes: Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the probability to remain employed are based on simulated
employment durations with and without training for a subset of the originally treated persons, cf.
p. 23.
stant thereafter. When the vertical dierence stabilizes, the eect of long-term
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training is about twice as large as that of short-term training. Thus, long-term
training increases the stability of employment much more strongly than short-term
training. Taking the horizontal dierence between the survivor functions with and
without training in each graph we obtain the quantile treatment eect. Figure 3
shows that the quantile treatment eects are increasing with decreasing percentiles
of the survivor functions. The substantial heterogeneity of the quantile treatment
eects suggests that there is also a considerable heterogeneity in the distribution of
individual treatment eects.35
Table 3 translates the rather qualitative ndings obtained from gure 3 into sum-
mary statistics and provides bootstrapped standard errors. The impact of short-
term training on the expected employment duration (truncation point is 1825 days)
is 7 days, 1.4%, and insignicant. The eect of long-term training on the mean
employment duration is with 23 days or 5% somewhat bigger but still insignicant.
However, at the median and the 70th percentile the horizontal distance between
the cumulative distribution functions with and without long-term training is much
larger and increasing. Similarly, the probability of survival in employment ve years
after the start of the spell is 9 percentage points or 45% higher with long-term train-
ing compared to the situation without. The corresponding number for short-term
training is 5 percentage points, a bit less than 30%. 29% of the survival times in
employment associated with long-term training exceed 1825 days compared to 22%
of those with short-term training. This suggests, that the truncated mean underes-
timates in particular the eect of long-term training on the subsequent employment
duration.
Table 4 shows the impacts of training on average daily earnings during the rst
year after reemployment. Short-term training has no eect on earnings. The point
estimate is almost zero and not signicant statistically. Contrary to the descriptive
ndings, long-term training leads to signicant earnings gains of e3.37 or 7% a
day. These estimates likely underestimate the full monetary return to training as
our earnings measure refers to the rst year after reemployment only. In fact,
our ndings for employment stability suggest that especially persons treated with
long-term training accumulate more work experience than without training over the
longer run. This may lead to additional earnings gains in the medium and long
run.36
35See Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) for a discussion of properties of the distribution of
individual treatment eects that can be inferred from the marginal distributions of treatment and
nontreatment outcomes.
36To get an idea of the persistence of training impacts in later unemployment and employment
spells, we include indicators for lagged training participation. Overall, the estimates indicate some
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Table 3: Nontreatment Outcomes (NTO) and Treatment Eects on the Treated
(TT) for Employment Duration
E(T jT  1825) Pr(T > 1825) P30 P50 P70
Short-term training
NTO 435.57 (9.07) 0.17 (0.01) 207 (4.72) 330 (7.20) 869 (38.67)
TT 6.99 (14.31) 0.05 (0.02) 11 (11.22) 48 (40.20) 279 (129.57)
Long-term training
NTO 445.96 (7.17) 0.20 (0.01) 216 (4.03) 354 (8.50) 1050 (47.70)
TT 22.71 (16.61) 0.09 (0.03) 35 (15.20) 215 (92.31) 682 (176.65)
Notes: Employment duration is measured in days. P30, P50, P70 refer to the percentiles of the
cumulative distribution function. Calculations are based on simulated employment durations with
and without training for a subset of the originally treated persons. Bootstrapped standard errors
based on 250 replications in parentheses. ,  and  denote signicance at the 10%-, 5%- and
1%- level, respectively.
Table 4: Nontreatment Outcomes (NTO) and Treatment Eects on the Treated
(TT) for Daily Earnings
E(T jT  144) Pr(T > 144) P25 P50 P75
Short-term training
NTO 46.29 (0.83) 0.015 (0.001) 26.22 (0.66) 45.54 (1.06) 63.55 (1.03)
TT -0.05 (0.58) -0.003 (0.001) 0.20 (0.45) -0.06 (0.72) -0.62 (0.70)
Long-term training
NTO 47.02 (0.88) 0.014 (0.001) 26.58 (0.70) 46.67 (1.12) 64.67 (1.12)
TT 3.37 (1.48) 0.001 (0.003) 3.59 (1.33) 4.58 (1.69) 3.56 (2.05)
Notes: Earnings per calendar day are measured in e (real values, reference year 2000). P25,
P50, P75 refer to the percentiles of the cumulative distribution function. Calculations are based
on simulated earnings with and without training for a subset of the originally treated persons.
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%- level, respectively.
5.2 Importance of the Timing of Training
We model the time dependence of treatment eects as proportional shifts of the haz-
ard rate out of unemployment that vary with time relative to the planned program
end. In addition, we include a linear and a quadratic term of the log unemploy-
ment duration at program start in the hazard rate. This specication allows for
complex eects of the timing of training during the unemployment spell. In order
to assess the ceteris paribus eect of changing the starting date of training during
persistence across spells. However, positive eects on employment stability tend to be oset by
negative eects on unemployment duration.
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unemployment, we predict the truncated mean unemployment duration associated
with dierent starting dates for a reference person with characteristics at the mean
or mode of each covariate. Specically, this person is a male German aged 38 at the
start of the spell, married without children, living in the German federal state of
North Rhine-Westphalia, holding a secondary schooling degree reached at the end of
the 10th grade (Realschule) and a vocational training degree, previously employed
as a bluecollar craftsman in the trade and transport sector, with log daily earnings
of 3.9 (i.e. in the third quartile), entitled to 340 days of unemployment benets,
considered as having relevant vocational qualication and experience by the case-
worker, and starting his unemployment spell in the rst quarter of 2000.37 The
planned program durations are set to their medians at 26 (short-term training) and
201 days (long-term training), respectively. The unobserved heterogeneity terms are
set to their mean values.
Figure 4: Training Impacts on Unemployment Duration by Starting Date
(a) From Start of Unemployment (b) From Start of Training
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Notes: Calculations are based on the predicted means measured from the start of the spell (panel
(a)) and from the start of training (panel (b)), respectively, for a reference person, cf. p. 28. The
truncated means are calculated according to eq. (4). The truncation point is 1825 days in the left
panel and 731 days in the right. The grey lines are 95% condence intervals based on bootstrapped
standard errors with 250 replications.
Panel (a) of gure 4 shows the impact of the timing of training on the truncated
expected unemployment duration measured from the start of unemployment until
day 1825 and the right panel the impact on the truncated expected remaining unem-
ployment duration measured from the start of training until day 731 after training
37The original estimation includes time-varying dummies indicating dierent seasons of the year.
In the simulation, we assign each of these variables a time-constant value representing their share
in a given calendar year. This way we obtain expected outcome durations that are seasonally
adjusted.
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start.38 Panel (a) suggests that, in absolute value, the impact of both short-term and
long-term training on the total unemployment duration is strongest when training
is started early during unemployment, but with opposite signs. A participation in
long-term training starting during the rst three months of unemployment increases
the total expected time in unemployment by up to 151 days, whereas a participa-
tion in short-term training in the same period decreases the total expected time in
unemployment by up to 43 days. With increasing elapsed unemployment duration
at program start the impacts of both training programs on the total expected un-
employment duration decrease in absolute value. The eect of long-term training
converges to +16 days whereas that of short-term training approaches to zero as the
time in unemployment at program start increases.
Panel (b) of gure 4 displays the impact of the timing of training on the remaining
time in unemployment counted from the start of the program. The impact of short-
term training is largely constant at about  40 days regardless of the starting date
during unemployment. In contrast, the impact of long-term training on the remain-
ing time in unemployment displays a declining pattern, from about +115 days for
program starts during the rst three months to +60 days for program starts in the
eighth quarter after the beginning of unemployment. The dierent patterns in panel
(a) and (b) of gure 4 reect that longer survival times are weighted dierently in
the two graphs. While the expected value from the start of training (panel (b)) con-
ditions on survival in unemployment until program start, the expected value from
the start of unemployment (panel (a)) accounts for the possibility that the unem-
ployment spell may terminate before the start of training. Therefore, in panel (a),
training impacts at later points in time during unemployment receive a lower weight
than training impacts occurring at the start of unemployment. This dierence in
weighting largely drives the apparently diminishing eectiveness of short-term train-
ing in panel (a), while the analogue does not hold for long-term training. In fact,
our ndings suggest that long-term training programs starting later during unem-
ployment lead to a considerably smaller increase in unemployment duration.
5.3 Eect Heterogeneity Across Observed Characteristics
Our estimated models exibly account for heterogeneous treatment eects across
observed and unobserved variables. To examine the dierences across observed
characteristics, we aggregate the simulated treatment and nontreatment outcomes
in a given subgroup, e.g. men, and calculate the treatment eect in this subgroup.
38The truncated expectations are calculated according to eq. (4).
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The entries in tables 5 and 6 show the program impact on the treated for the
subgroup given in the row label. The treatment eects refer to the truncated means
for the outcomes remaining time in unemployment from program start and planned
program end as well as daily earnings. The truncation points are 731 days, 365 days
and e144, respectively. For the outcome employment duration, we present results
on the quantile treatment eect evaluated at the median and on the probability to
remain employed after 1825 days. The last row for each set of subgroups provides
the p-value of a Wald test that the treatment eects are equal across subgroups.39
Several interesting dierences across groups emerge. Female participants in long-
term training tend to benet more than males, whereas no consistent gender dier-
ences exist for short-term training. Long-term training increases the remaining time
in unemployment measured from the program start by 87 days (44.6%) for women
and 102 days (56.8%) for men. Female participants in long-term training achieve
higher employment gains of 291 days (64.8%) at the median and earnings gains of
e4.37 (10.4%) on average per calendar day as opposed to 115 days (36.7%) and
e2.69 (5.2%), respectively, for males. For older workers aged 45 and above, short-
term training tends to work less well than for the younger age groups. However, the
null hypothesis of equal of treatment eects across age groups cannot be rejected
for any of the impact measures at conventional signicance levels. Comparing the
results for foreign nationals to those of Germans participating in long-term training,
we nd very small eects on employment duration for foreign people but large ef-
fects for Germans (e.g. a quantile treatment eect of +312 days, 84.7%). However,
foreign nationals participating in long-term training exhibit higher earnings gains of
e4.83 (11.1%) on average per calendar day as opposed to e2.80 (5.8%).
39As an alternative, in section I in the Online Appendix, we provide evidence from hypothesis
tests that indicate whether the proportionate treatment eect on the hazard rate is dierent for a
particular subgroup keeping everything else constant.
31
T
ab
le
5:
H
et
er
og
en
eo
u
s
T
re
at
m
en
t
E

ec
ts
of
S
h
or
t-
T
er
m
T
ra
in
in
g
R
em
ai
n
in
g
D
ay
s
in
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
fr
om
P
ro
gr
am
S
ta
rt
P
la
n
n
ed
P
ro
g.
E
n
d
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
ar
n
in
gs
E
[T
jT

73
1]
E
[T
jT

36
5]
P
50
P
r(
T
>
18
25
)
E
[T
jT

14
4]
G
en
d
er
M
al
e
-2
0.
19
(4
.5
6)
-1
1.
43
(1
.8
8)
30
(2
3.
80
)
0.
05
3
(0
.0
21
)
-0
.9
1
(0
.6
8)
F
em
al
e
-1
1.
58
(5
.2
8)
-1
0.
13
(1
.7
1)
92
(5
6.
97
)
0.
04
3
(0
.0
20
)
1.
24
(0
.7
8)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
12
3
0.
47
4
0.
14
0
0.
58
8
0.
01
4
N
at
io
n
al
it
y
G
er
m
an
-1
5.
22
(4
.2
0)
-1
0.
39
(1
.7
0)
61
(5
1.
82
)
0.
04
2
(0
.0
19
)
-0
.7
2
(0
.6
1)
F
or
ei
gn
-1
8.
94
(4
.3
6)
-1
1.
81
(1
.8
4)
52
(3
0.
38
)
0.
06
2
(0
.0
22
)
1.
49
(0
.9
2)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
19
0
0.
38
7
0.
80
0
0.
27
6
0.
01
8
A
ge
A
ge
25
-3
4
-1
7.
72
(4
.3
8)
-1
2.
13
(1
.8
9)
36
(3
0.
83
)
0.
03
9
(0
.0
19
)
0.
04
(0
.6
0)
A
ge
35
-4
4
-1
7.
55
(4
.4
7)
-1
0.
51
(2
.0
0)
64
(4
7.
29
)
0.
05
2
(0
.0
18
)
-0
.1
2
(0
.5
8)
A
ge
45
+
-1
0.
87
(4
.6
5)
-8
.5
7
(1
.9
4)
64
(4
5.
28
)
0.
06
4
(0
.0
27
)
-0
.0
8
(0
.6
5)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
10
4
0.
20
2
0.
30
1
0.
42
4
0.
60
0
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
N
o
vo
c.
d
eg
re
e
an
d
m
is
si
n
g
-1
5.
23
(4
.1
2)
-1
1.
57
(1
.6
9)
17
(1
4.
15
)
0.
01
4
(0
.0
17
)
0.
52
(0
.6
1)
V
o
ca
ti
on
al
tr
ai
n
in
g
d
eg
re
e
-1
8.
05
(4
.3
7)
-1
1.
24
(1
.7
3)
10
2
(5
4.
29
)
0.
07
2
(0
.0
21
)
-0
.1
7
(0
.6
1)
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
d
eg
re
e
-7
.8
1
(5
.4
8)
-3
.4
9
(3
.3
5)
10
4
(5
7.
74
)
0.
01
1
(0
.0
28
)
-0
.1
6
(0
.7
4)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
09
9
0.
02
5
0.
11
5
0.
00
0
0.
08
8
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
E
le
m
en
ta
ry
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s
-1
2.
72
(4
.1
0)
-9
.4
5
(2
.3
7)
19
(1
7.
18
)
0.
06
5
(0
.0
22
)
0.
46
(0
.6
5)
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l
o
cc
.
an
d
m
is
si
n
g
15
.1
2
(1
0.
85
)
0.
67
(5
.5
6)
10
(1
7.
74
)
-0
.0
26
(0
.0
52
)
0.
12
(0
.8
3)
P
la
n
t/
m
ac
h
in
e
op
er
at
or
-1
6.
51
(4
.2
4)
-1
3.
42
(2
.8
4)
31
(2
6.
07
)
0.
01
8
(0
.0
30
)
0.
10
(0
.7
2)
C
ra
ft
an
d
re
la
te
d
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s
-2
3.
85
(5
.3
2)
-1
3.
84
(2
.1
1)
16
(1
1.
35
)
0.
04
5
(0
.0
22
)
-0
.4
6
(0
.7
3)
S
er
v
ic
e
w
or
ke
r
-1
4.
47
(5
.2
6)
-9
.0
3
(2
.7
1)
73
(4
9.
19
)
0.
05
4
(0
.0
27
)
1.
53
(0
.7
2)
C
le
rk
-1
7.
11
(5
.5
5)
-1
0.
21
(2
.0
9)
99
(6
4.
55
)
0.
06
5
(0
.0
26
)
-0
.3
8
(0
.9
6)
T
ec
h
n
.,
as
so
c.
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
-1
5.
92
(5
.7
9)
-1
6.
57
(2
.4
1)
12
9
(6
3.
75
)
0.
07
7
(0
.0
32
)
-0
.1
9
(0
.8
6)
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
-1
0.
99
(6
.6
9)
-1
.5
5
(3
.1
7)
44
(6
3.
59
)
0.
02
9
(0
.0
25
)
-0
.3
8
(0
.7
9)
S
en
io
r
o
ci
al
,
m
an
ag
er
-2
9.
48
(1
0.
02
)
-8
.8
5
(4
.6
2)
10
5
(7
8.
81
)
0.
02
8
(0
.0
51
)
0.
62
(1
.0
9)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
01
4
0.
00
0
0.
00
8
0.
32
4
0.
03
4
N
o
te
s:
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
a
n
d
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
s
a
re
m
ea
su
re
d
in
d
ay
s,
ea
rn
in
g
s
p
er
ca
le
n
d
a
r
d
ay
in
e
(r
ea
l
va
lu
es
,
re
fe
re
n
ce
y
ea
r
2
0
0
0
).
P
5
0
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
d
i
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
tr
ea
tm
en
t
a
n
d
n
o
n
tr
ea
tm
en
t
o
u
tc
o
m
es
a
t
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
o
f
th
e
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fu
n
ct
io
n
s.
C
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
si
m
u
la
te
d
o
u
tc
o
m
es
w
it
h
a
n
d
w
it
h
o
u
t
tr
a
in
in
g
fo
r
a
su
b
se
t
o
f
th
e
o
ri
g
in
a
ll
y
tr
ea
te
d
p
er
so
n
s.
B
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
b
a
se
d
o
n
2
5
0
re
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
32
T
ab
le
6:
H
et
er
og
en
eo
u
s
T
re
at
m
en
t
E

ec
ts
of
L
on
g-
T
er
m
T
ra
in
in
g
R
em
ai
n
in
g
D
ay
s
in
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
fr
om
P
ro
gr
am
S
ta
rt
P
la
n
n
ed
P
ro
g.
E
n
d
E
m
p
lo
y
m
en
t
E
ar
n
in
gs
E
[T
jT

73
1]
E
[T
jT

36
5]
P
50
P
r(
T
>
18
25
)
E
[T
jT

14
4]
G
en
d
er
M
al
e
10
2.
22
(4
.2
7)
-2
4.
19
(3
.3
2)
11
5
(7
4.
82
)
0.
07
7
(0
.0
30
)
2.
69
(1
.5
7)
F
em
al
e
87
.3
1
(4
.5
3)
-2
4.
89
(3
.2
7)
29
1
(1
33
.8
4)
0.
11
0
(0
.0
35
)
4.
37
(1
.5
3)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
00
0
0.
80
5
0.
02
6
0.
09
8
0.
05
1
N
at
io
n
al
it
y
G
er
m
an
95
.3
3
(4
.1
9)
-2
6.
20
(3
.0
3)
31
2
(1
18
.1
1)
0.
11
8
(0
.0
32
)
2.
80
(1
.5
1)
F
or
ei
gn
94
.5
2
(5
.2
6)
-2
0.
64
(3
.6
9)
46
(5
8.
59
)
0.
02
9
(0
.0
35
)
4.
83
(1
.6
5)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
82
9
0.
04
8
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
04
8
A
ge
A
ge
25
-3
4
10
5.
07
(4
.2
1)
-2
1.
47
(3
.6
6)
18
3
(9
1.
28
)
0.
08
7
(0
.0
32
)
3.
11
(1
.4
7)
A
ge
35
-4
4
84
.8
3
(4
.6
4)
-2
8.
68
(3
.2
5)
23
6
(9
6.
94
)
0.
08
8
(0
.0
32
)
3.
57
(1
.4
8)
A
ge
45
+
93
.6
6
(5
.3
1)
-2
1.
00
(4
.0
7)
22
8
(8
8.
52
)
0.
11
3
(0
.0
34
)
3.
51
(1
.5
3)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
00
0
0.
01
8
0.
00
6
0.
34
6
0.
05
9
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
N
o
vo
c.
d
eg
re
e
an
d
m
is
si
n
g
93
.0
4
(4
.4
5)
-2
2.
45
(3
.5
7)
49
(5
2.
05
)
0.
04
3
(0
.0
31
)
4.
12
(1
.4
7)
V
o
ca
ti
on
al
tr
ai
n
in
g
d
eg
re
e
92
.7
7
(4
.4
2)
-2
5.
03
(3
.0
8)
31
1
(1
30
.2
1)
0.
12
0
(0
.0
34
)
3.
32
(1
.5
6)
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
d
eg
re
e
12
5.
15
(5
.8
4)
-3
4.
09
(6
.4
8)
35
0
(2
13
.1
0)
0.
09
9
(0
.0
45
)
1.
85
(1
.3
5)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
00
0
0.
12
9
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
E
le
m
en
ta
ry
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s
93
.4
6
(5
.3
7)
-2
0.
58
(4
.5
9)
60
(5
4.
53
)
0.
02
2
(0
.0
34
)
5.
53
(1
.5
0)
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l
o
cc
.
an
d
m
is
si
n
g
97
.8
0
(8
.2
4)
-4
5.
47
(1
3.
15
)
47
(5
6.
98
)
0.
07
7
(0
.0
39
)
4.
09
(1
.6
2)
P
la
n
t/
m
ac
h
in
e
op
er
at
or
89
.9
9
(4
.6
7)
-2
3.
17
(5
.0
1)
54
(5
6.
86
)
0.
07
8
(0
.0
31
)
5.
06
(1
.6
4)
C
ra
ft
an
d
re
la
te
d
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
s
90
.5
8
(4
.6
1)
-3
0.
85
(4
.0
2)
64
(5
9.
14
)
0.
08
7
(0
.0
36
)
3.
20
(1
.9
3)
S
er
v
ic
e
w
or
ke
r
99
.5
4
(6
.5
7)
-1
1.
59
(5
.3
3)
16
1
(9
0.
64
)
0.
07
3
(0
.0
33
)
6.
80
(1
.5
5)
C
le
rk
89
.6
1
(4
.8
7)
-2
8.
53
(4
.0
6)
35
4
(1
51
.8
3)
0.
11
1
(0
.0
39
)
1.
63
(1
.6
9)
T
ec
h
n
.,
as
so
c.
p
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
99
.8
4
(4
.2
8)
-2
2.
16
(4
.1
9)
43
2
(1
70
.2
5)
0.
16
6
(0
.0
38
)
1.
22
(1
.6
6)
P
ro
fe
ss
io
n
al
10
6.
97
(5
.7
2)
-2
9.
37
(5
.8
8)
20
7
(1
67
.7
5)
0.
09
1
(0
.0
40
)
0.
33
(1
.4
3)
S
en
io
r
o
ci
al
,
m
an
ag
er
13
9.
72
(1
1.
63
)
-3
3.
95
(1
3.
24
)
42
7
(2
48
.2
0)
0.
16
6
(0
.1
55
)
8.
60
(2
.0
4)
p-
V
al
u
e
of
W
al
d
T
es
t
of
E
q
u
al
it
y
0.
00
0
0.
00
7
0.
07
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
N
o
te
s:
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
a
n
d
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
s
a
re
m
ea
su
re
d
in
d
ay
s,
ea
rn
in
g
s
p
er
ca
le
n
d
a
r
d
ay
in
e
(r
ea
l
va
lu
es
,
re
fe
re
n
ce
y
ea
r
2
0
0
0
).
P
5
0
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
d
i
er
en
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
tr
ea
tm
en
t
a
n
d
n
o
n
tr
ea
tm
en
t
o
u
tc
o
m
es
a
t
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
o
f
th
e
cu
m
u
la
ti
v
e
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
fu
n
ct
io
n
s.
C
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s
a
re
b
a
se
d
o
n
si
m
u
la
te
d
o
u
tc
o
m
es
w
it
h
a
n
d
w
it
h
o
u
t
tr
a
in
in
g
fo
r
a
su
b
se
t
o
f
th
e
o
ri
g
in
a
ll
y
tr
ea
te
d
p
er
so
n
s.
B
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
p
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
b
a
se
d
o
n
2
5
0
re
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
33
High-skilled participants in long-term training holding a university degree or pre-
viously working as senior ocials, managers and professionals exhibit very strong
lock-in eects, i.e. a 107 to 140 days (around 60%) increase in the remaining unem-
ployment duration measured from the program start. For participants in long-term
training previously working in low- to medium-skilled occupations the corresponding
gure lies between +90 and +100 days (around 50%). Persons with low formal qual-
ications as well as persons previously working in elementary occupations exhibit
small employment gains: at the median the eect is +49 days (16.2%) for low skilled
and +60 days (20.1%) for elementary occupations, respectively. In contrast, people
with medium formal qualications and people previously working in medium-skilled
job that are intensive in analytic and interactive tasks show very strong employment
gains. Technicians and associate professionals, for instance, gain 432 employment
days (89.8%) at the median and have a 16.6 percentage points (69.3%) higher prob-
ability to remain employed after ve years. High skilled and persons in high-skilled
occupations also show big point estimates for employment duration, but the stan-
dard errors tend to be large as well.
When it comes to earnings impacts of long-term training the ordering tends to be
reversed. Persons with low formal education and persons previously working in low-
and medium-skilled manual jobs (in particular, elementary occupations and service
workers) reap the highest earnings gains of e4.12, e5.53 and e6.80, respectively.
In relative terms, these earnings gains are in the order of 10.3%, 15.1%, and 18.9%,
respectively, a substantial amount from an economic point of view. Senior ocials
and managers, experience an earnings gain of e8.60 per calendar day, which corre-
sponds to a gain of 11.9% in relative terms. The earnings gains for persons holding
a university degree as well as for people previously working in high- and medium-
skilled occupations that are intensive in analytic and interactive tasks, in contrast,
are small (between e0.33 and 1.85).
The diering impacts of long-term training across occupation groups may also con-
tribute to explaining the dierences across gender. In our sample, 36.8% of female
job-seekers previously worked as clerk or technician and associate professional as
opposed to only 18.1% of the males. These occupations reap the highest employ-
ment gains. 23.9% of the women as opposed to 7.5% of the men previously worked
as service workers, a group with above average earnings gains. 49% of the male
unemployed previously worked in production occupations (plant/machine operator
or craft and related occupations) that show below average employment gains from
long-term training. However, the earnings gains for these occupations tend to be
above average. Similarly, the smaller employment and higher earnings eects for
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foreign nationals as opposed to Germans participating in long-term training may be
associated with their higher shares in elementary and production occupations.
As regards short-term training, the group of technicians and associate professionals
exhibits exceptionally high benets in terms of employment stability with a quantile
treatment eect of +129 days (25.5%). For the other occupation groups the quantile
treatment eects for employment duration are smaller. However, we nd sizeable
impacts of 5 to 8 percentage points on the probability to be still employed after ve
years for ve out of nine occupation groups. Overall, the dierences across skill and
occupation groups do not suggest a coherent interpretation.
In sum, these patterns suggest that long-term training programs facilitate the oc-
cupational advancement of heterogeneous groups of participants. However, their
benecial eects manifest in dierent ways across dierent groups. While they have
large positive eects on employment stability for people in medium- to high-skilled
analytic and interactive jobs, there are almost no employment eects for people
in low- to medium-skilled service and production occupations. However, the latter
groups show above average earnings gains, whereas the former earn hardly more
than without training. The often sizeable employment and earnings gains come at
the cost of prolonged unemployment spells. The opportunity cost of participating
in long-term training is highest for people holding a university degree as well as for
senior ocials and managers. Short-term training programs do not harm any of the
groups considered but their benecial eects are generally limited in magnitude.
5.4 Cost-Benet Assessment
From a policy point of view it is important to know whether the gains of participat-
ing in short-term or long-term training outweigh the costs. In order to get an idea
of the cost-eectiveness of the programs consider the following back-of-the-envelope
calculations. A short-term training course costs on average e560 and a long-term
training course e5,850 (cf. table B1 in the Online Appendix). The employment
agency pays on average e1,050 per month for an unemployed entitled to unem-
ployment benets. Extrapolating beyond the limits imposed by our data we can
calculate the impacts of training on the nontruncated means of unemployment and
employment duration as well as earnings as averages across our sample of treated
persons.40 A participation in short-term training reduces the expected unemploy-
40We compute the (nontruncated) expected treatment and nontreatment outcomes as follows:
E[T ] =
R t
0
S(r)dr + S(t)=(t), with S(t) the survivor function and (t) the hazard rate at T = t.
This means, we extrapolate beyond truncation point t assuming a constant hazard rate equal to
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ment duration by 53 days (-7.5%), increases the expected employment duration by
162 days (+19.1%) and reduces average daily earnings by e-0.46 (-1.0%). Long-
term training increases unemployment duration by 97 days (+15.7%), employment
duration by 330 days (+34.9%) and daily earnings by e3.50 (+7.2%).
These calculations indicate that short-term training is likely cost eective, both
from the taxpayer's and the participant's perspective. It reduces unemployment
duration and the associated transfer payments by about e1,850. These savings in
transfer payments exceed the course fees by a factor of three. In addition, short-term
training positively aects the expected time in subsequent employment. In contrast,
the picture is less clear for long-term training. With the additional benet payments
arising during the extra time in unemployment, a long-term training course causes
about e9,000 of additional costs for the taxpayer compared to the situation of
nonparticipation. Yet in view of the substantial positive eects on employment
duration and the moderate earnings gains, it might be possible that in the long
run also long-term training pays o from a scal point of view. As the benets
in terms of reduced unemployment insurance payments and higher tax revenues
accumulate over time they may eventually exceed the initial investment of e9,000.
Further, from the perspective of the participant, long-term training programs well
seem to be attractive on average. Indeed, while unemployed participants receive
relatively generous unemployment benets. Once they have completed their long-
term training course, on average, they quickly take up a job that is more stable
and pays more than without training. A full assessment of the cost-eectiveness of
both training programs according to a social cost-benet criterion, that considers
the costs and benets that accrue to taxpayers and participants alike, would require
further assumptions and information, e.g. on discount rates and tax scales.
6 Conclusion
This study investigates and compares the dynamic causal eects of short-term, job-
search oriented training and long-term, human capital intensive training schemes.
Our empirical analysis uses rich administrative data for Germany, where both pro-
gram types are used at the same time. We examine and compare the separate
eects of both programs on unemployment and employment spells as well as daily
earnings, taking into account the heterogeneity of training impacts according to the
the hazard rate at t. We set t to 1460 days for unemployment duration, 1825 days for employment
duration, and e144 for daily earnings.
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timing of participation during unemployment as well as across dierent subgroups
of participants.
We nd that participating in short-term training reduces the remaining time in
unemployment and has moderate positive eects on subsequent job stability. Long-
term training programs initially prolong the remaining time in unemployment, but
once the scheduled program end is reached participants exit to employment at a
much faster rate than without training. Moreover, participants in long-term training
benet from substantially more stable employment spells and higher earnings.
Importantly, our ndings point to the possibility of improving the eciency of long-
term training programs through a careful targeting. Specically, we nd that the
opportunity cost of participating in terms of prolonged unemployment is lower for
people with lower chances to exit unemployment on their own, e.g. long-term unem-
ployed and low skilled. Persons without formal education degree and persons previ-
ously working in low- and medium-skilled manual occupations reap particularly high
benets with respect to earnings. Persons previously working in medium-skilled an-
alytic and interactive occupations achieve substantial gains in terms of employment
stability. Thus, long-term training programs seem well eective in supporting the
occupational advancement of very heterogeneous groups of people, including those
with generally weak labor market prospects. However, from a more narrow, scal
perspective only the low-cost short-term training schemes are on average cost e-
cient in the short run.41 In light of the recent policy shifts favoring short, job-search
oriented training programs a more balanced use of both types of training seems
warranted. In fact, while the shorter programs may appeal for their cost eciency
the longer programs seem more eective in tackling structural decits.
From a conceptual point of view, our study highlights that time is an important
dimension of program evaluation not appropriately accounted for in conventional
static and experimental research designs. A detailed analysis of the dynamics of
program assignment and labor market outcomes, considering also impact hetero-
geneity allows a deeper understanding of how programs work. This knowledge is
important for an optimal use of public employment services.
41All these conclusions hold with the caveat that general equilibrium eects are not accounted
for.
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A Detailed Identication Analysis
In this section, we lay out the details of the identication analysis of the model
described in section 3.2. Our goal is to identify the single components of the hazard
rates kl() dened in equation (3) and the joint distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms, which then yields the joint distribution of the survival times.
The identication analysis is somewhat nonstandard as dierent parts of our model
require dierent identifying assumptions. We start with the probability of survival
in the initial state and then move on to the higher order transitions.
Let TOl 2 R+ be the survival time in the initial state O until exit to state l 2
Za(O)  fS(O); L(O); E(O)g, where S denotes short-term training, L long-term
training and E employment. The state in parentheses, i.e. (O), indicates dependence
of current transition rates on the past trajectory. Let x(t) denote the covariate
process just before time t, x(t)  fx(r); 0  r < tg the covariate path on [0; t),
and X its support. Integrating the hazard rate in equation (3) over t we obtain the
integrated hazard:
(1) Ol(tjx(t); vOl) 
Z t
0
Ol(r; x(r))dr

vOl = Ol(t; x(t)) vOl ;
where the function Ol(t; x(t)) : (R+X)! R+ is the integrated structural hazard
that summarizes the dependence on observed factors and vOl is a non-negative unob-
served heterogeneity term with support VOl. Conditional on the observed covariates
the probability of survival in the initial state is:
Pr(\l2Za(O) TOl > tjx(t))
=
Z
VOS(O)
Z
VOL(O)
Z
VOE(O)
exp
"
 
X
l
l(t; x(t))Ol
#
dG1O(OS(O); OL(O); OE(O))
= LG1O

OS(O)(t; x(t));OL(O)(t; x(t));OE(O)(t; x(t))

;
1
where G1O is the cumulative distribution function of (vOS(O); vOL(O); vOE(O)) and
LG1O(s1; s2; s3) its trivariate Laplace transform. With competing destination states,
the joint and marginal survival probabilities are not observed but the sub-survival
probabilities
QOl(tjx(t))  Pr

TOl > t;\m2Za(O)nl TOm > TOljx(t)

and the sub-survival densities
Q0Ol(tjx(t))  @QOl(tjx(t))=@t
= Ol(t; x(t))DOlLG1O(OS(O)(t; x(t));OL(O)(t; x(t));OE(O)(t; x(t))) ;(2)
where DiLG1O(s1; s2; s3)  @LG1O(s1; s2; s3)=@si, i = 1; 2; 3. We have that the proba-
bility of survival in the initial state Pr(\l2Za(O) TOl > t) =
P
lQOl(t), Tsiatis (1975,
Theorem 1). Identication of the subdensities (2) and G1O is discussed in Abbring
and van den Berg (2003b). In the model with employment as the second outcome
we use repeated cycles per individual. In this case, identication does not require
variation with observed covariates (Abbring and van den Berg 2003b, Proposition
3).
In the model with earnings as the second outcome we have only one cycle per
individual. Therefore, we impose more structure on the variation of the haz-
ard rates with observed covariates. We model the hazard rates as proportional
in the three components a exible nonnegative function of elapsed duration,
0Ol(t), of observed covariates, Ol(x(t)), and unobserved heterogeneity, vOl,
i.e.: Ol(t; x(t)) = 
0
Ol(t)Ol(x(t))vOl. Further, we assume that x(t) includes
three continuous covariates that are independent of vOl, l 2 Za(O), and that
(OS(O)(x(t)); OL(O)(x(t)); OE(O)(x(t))) varies on a nonempty open set in R3+. In
the model with earnings, the probability of survival in the initial state is identied
applying Abbring and van den Berg (2003b, Proposition 2) with one exception. As
x(t) includes time-varying covariates we do not need niteness of the mean of the
unobservables, see Heckman and Taber (1994, Theorem 4) replicating a proof in
Honoré (1990).
In contrast to (2), the subdensities for the second and higher order transitions depend
on lagged duration in unemployment,  . The conditional sub-survival densities for
transitions from the second state in a cycle k 2 fS(O); L(O); E(O)g equal:
Q0kl(tj; x(t); vOS(O); vOL(O); vOE(O))
= kl(t; ; x(t))
DklLG2k(fkl(t; ; x(t)) : l 2 Za(k)g);
2
where G2k = G
2
k(fvkl : l 2 Za(k)gjvOS(O); vOL(O); vOE(O)). As regards the tran-
sition rates from L(O) and E(O) we can directly apply the result from Brinch
(2007) to identify G2k(vkljvOS(O); vOL(O); vOE(O)) and kl(). Brinch shows that in
a mixed hazard model with univariate unobserved heterogeneity and time-varying
covariates the survival distribution is nonparametrically identied without func-
tional form restrictions beyond separability of the hazard rate in the unobserved
heterogeneity term. Further, we model the hazard rate from S(O) to L(S) as
OL(O)( + t; x(t))S(O)L(S)(x(t))vOL(O), where S(O)L(S)() is some exible nonnega-
tive function.1 OL(O)() and the distribution of vOL(O) have been identied previ-
ously. S(O)L(S)(x(t)) can be identied following Abbring and van den Berg (2003a,
Proposition 3). With this restriction, we can apply Brinch's strategy to identify
the transition rate from S(O) to E(S), too. In practice, we model the transi-
tion rates from treated unemployment, k 2 fS(O); L(O)g, to employment, E(k),
as kE(k)(t; ; x(t); vkE(k)) = OE(O)( + t; x(t))kE(k)(; x(t))vkE(k). In this way, we
align treated and controls with respect to their unemployment experience.
In our alternative model with earnings as the second outcome, we do not have
covariates that vary with the level of earnings. We can apply the identication
results of Honoré (1993, Theorem 3) or, alternatively, Horny and Picchio (2010) to
the subdensity of earnings. Here, we need additional proportionality restrictions,
i.e. kE(k)(t; ; x; vkE(k)) = 
0
kE(k)(t)kE(k)()kE(k)(x)vkE(k), with 
0
kE(k)(), kE(k)(),
kE(k)() some exible nonnegative functions, and additional assumptions on the
variation with observed covariates, analogous to those on the hazard rates from the
initial state in the model with earnings.
We proceed analogously with the remaining transitions in a cycle. Once we know
all the integrated structural hazards, kl(), we can trace out the joint distribution
of the unobservables, G(v), by varying the observed arguments (i.e. t; ; x(t)) of
the hazard rates on a nonempty open set in Rp+, where p is the dimension of v,
Abbring and van den Berg (2003b, Proposition 1). Due to the analyticity of the
Laplace transform we only need locally independent variation of the hazard rates
with observables in order to identify the joint distribution of the unobservables on
the entire domain. This requirement is substantially weaker than corresponding
assumptions on exclusion restrictions in discrete choice models.
1In principle, we could allow S(O)L(S)() to depend on  and t in addition to x(t).
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B Institutional Background
B.1 Unemployment, Job Search, and Job Training
Since the late 1990s public employment services in Germany increasingly emphasize
activation and individual responsibilities of job-seekers.2 People who seek support
from public employment services are required to undertake signicant independent
eorts towards nding a job. In particular, they have to attend counseling inter-
views, provide proof of their independent job search, and participate in active labor
market programs. On legal grounds, a caseworker has to provide detailed instruc-
tions to each particular job-seeker on what it takes for him/her to be actively looking
for a job (Schweiger, 2002). Typically, this includes a specication of the number
of written applications a job-seeker has to send out within a given period of time.
Such explicitness is necessary in order to create a legal basis for monitoring com-
pliance with search requirements. Job-seekers who fail to cooperate with the local
employment agency may receive punitive benet sanctions and be denied further
support.
While, during the period under study (i.e. 1999-2004), the regulation of public em-
ployment services is very specic on the importance of active job search, the link
between job training, individual needs of job-seekers, and demands of the labor
market is very vague. Eciency considerations play a limited role as job training
also serves social purposes. Rather, public sponsored training aims at improving
human capital as an end in itself.3 Furthermore, training programs, in particular
short-term training schemes, are used as an instrument to monitor the availability
and willingness to work.
The allocation of training schemes, as almost all active labor market programs, is
subject to the discretionary power of the caseworker at the local employment agency.
Registered job-seekers have no legal entitlement to receive any particular program
(Bieback, 1997). The caseworker has to judge participation in training as necessary
in order to improve the employment prospects of the job-seeker. The job-seeker and
the caseworker meet repeatedly during the unemployment spell to discuss further
search strategies and program participation. The unemployed may also just receive
a written notication to participate in a program. Training programs start at many
2For a summary of recent institutional developments of German labor market policy see Seeleib-
Kaiser and Fleckenstein (2007), for a detailed overview see Eichhorst et al. (2007).
3In this context, experts at local employment agencies talk of `stockpiling of human capital'
(Bildung auf Vorrat, Schneider et al., 2006, p. 77).
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dierent times during the year.4 Registered job-seekers may participate in a program
at any point in time during their unemployment spell. Participation is mandatory
and noncompliance may entail a temporary suspension of benets. However, job
placement has priority over program participation. The unemployed are therefore
encouraged to continue job search at any time, even while participating in a training
program.
The caseworker's assignment decision is to a large extent driven by the supply
of courses. In an informal procedure, the employment agencies and the training
providers negotiate in advance the quantities and contents of training courses to
be oered during the next calendar year. A high utilization of planned training
capacities is an important administrative target at the local employment agencies.5
Blaschke and Plath (2000) report that also private indicators of the caseworker like
the composition of a group of participants in a particular course or his/her assess-
ment of the motivation of the unemployed play an important role. However, case-
workers face a very high caseload which makes a careful targeting of job-seekers to
particular training programs or informal agreements between job-seekers and case-
workers impossible.6 The assignment to training programs occurs in general at short
notice. On the one hand short notice periods and belated assignments (i.e. after the
ocial starting date of a program) are used as a work test. On the other hand they
are convenient for caseworkers who want to ll upcoming training slots as well as
maintain incentives for independent job search at a high level.7
4Some training schemes also do not have xed start and end dates in the sense that a group of
participants starts a course with a xed scheduled duration together at some given date. Rather,
the schemes continue over an indenite period of time and new participants enrol for a varying
scheduled duration determined by the caseworker as soon as previous participants exit the program
(Blaschke and Plath, 2000).
5Experts at local labor agencies refer to the process of training assignment commonly as `ll-
ing/feeding of training slots' (Maÿnahmebeschickung, Maÿnahmefüllung, Schneider et al., 2006,
pp. 77, 98). Further evidence in Schneider et al. (2006) documents that planned and actually used
training capacities nearly coincide.
6In 2001 and 2002, the average caseload in terms of registered unemployed is about 400 unem-
ployed per caseworker (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 2002, p. 87). Mosley et al. (2002, p. 4) report a
caseload between 267 and 580 unemployed per caseworker in 2000 in West Germany. In addition,
caseworkers counsel people who register as job-seekers but are not unemployed as well as people
who do not register in the end.
7While the assignment of short-term training programs remained unchanged throughout our
analysis period, since 2003, long-term training schemes are assigned according to a somewhat
dierent regime. The reform aects about 10% of the long-term training programs in our sample.
Since the reform, candidates for a long-term training program obtain a voucher that details a
certain training eld. The job-seeker then redeems the voucher by choosing a suitable course
from a pool of certied courses. The voucher reform intended to make the allocation of training
programs more targeted and better tailored towards the needs of the unemployed. However, its
original goals were impaired by important diculties in the implementation of the new system. In
particular, it turned out that training providers tended to collect vouchers until a sucient critical
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B.2 Aggregate Figures on Participation and Expenditures
Active labor market policy in Germany comprises a variety of programs ranging from
subsidized employment on the rst labor market, job creation schemes on the second
labor market to job training programs that adjust and enhance the qualications of
participants. Employment subsidies aim at promoting either dependent employment
or business start-ups. Job creation schemes provide employment opportunities in
non-prot organizations for long-term and dicult-to-place unemployed. In addition
to these large scale programs, there also exist programs targeted to particular groups
as e.g. young or disabled persons. Active labor market policy is complemented by
placement and advisory services, that are increasingly contracted out to private
providers.
Long-term training schemes have traditionally been the most important eld of
active labor market policy in Germany. Since 1998 there have been several reforms
leading to a focus on measures considered particularly eective in activating the
unemployed in the short run and in preventing long-term unemployment. Thus,
allocation of resources shifted away from human capital intensive long-term training
to job-search oriented short-term training. Figure B1 shows a decline in entries in
the long-term training programs  in total Germany (panel (a)) as well as in the
Western Länder (panel (b))  whereas participation in short-term training increases
over time.
During the rst half of the 2000s, real public spending on active and passive la-
bor market policy is on average e70 billion per year, about 3.1 to 3.4% of GDP.
About e20 billion per year are spent on active labor market policies, a quarter of
that amount go to training (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2001a, 2003a, 2005a, table
II.E.6).8 Table B1 provides a breakdown of expenditures on training and unemploy-
ment insurance payments per person-month as well as average program durations.
It shows that the average monthly training costs per participant are slightly lower
for short-term training courses (560 Euros on average) than for traditional long-term
training schemes (650 Euros on average). Most striking is the great dierence in
number of participants was reached or they shortly canceled scheduled courses if there were too few
participants (Kühnlein and Klein, 2003; Schneider et al., 2006). According to surveys conducted by
the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB) among training providers, in
2003 and 2004, 50% and 60%, respectively, of the oered courses had to be canceled shortly because
of an insucient number of participants (Paulsen et al., 2006). Therefore, potential participants
faced a high uncertainty regarding the start of a long-term training program.
8According to OECD (2006, ch. 7), public spending on active labor market policies per unem-
ployed relative to per capita GDP in the years 2000 and 2001 is around 33% in Germany, which is
at the mean across OECD countries.
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Figure B1: Entries into Selected Active Labor Market Programs (in 1000)
(a) Germany (b) West Germany
0
30
0
60
0
90
0
1,
20
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Short−term training Long−term training
Job creation schemes Employment subsidies
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Short−term training Long−term training
Job creation schemes Employment subsidies
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (2001a, 2003a), Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2005a); own calcula-
tions.
average duration of the courses, that is displayed in the lower panel of table B1.
While short-term training courses last on average one month, the mean duration
of long-term training programs lies between eight and ten months. Under the bud-
getary pressure caused by a persistently high unemployment rate and in light of
these large dierences in costs, the share of short-term training measures drastically
increased in 2002 and, in 2003 and 2004, this rise continues at the expense of the
traditional longer-term measures. Of course, the higher training costs of the latter
would be justied if they were associated with correspondingly higher gains.
C Further Details on the Data Used
This study uses data from the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) Version
4.02 which are compiled by the Research Data Center of the German Federal Em-
ployment Agency.9 The IEB is an integrated administrative database combining
records out of four dierent registers: the Employment History (Beschäftigten-
Historik), the Benet Recipient History (Leistungsempfänger-Historik), the Job-
Seeker Database (Bewerberangebot), and the Program Participation History
(Maÿnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatenbank). The basic population consists of all
individuals who, during the period 1990 to mid-2005, have either held a job sub-
9For descriptions of the data see Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) and
http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx. The data are subject to condentiality regulations. A weakly
anonymous version can be used on-site and via controlled remote access, a factually anonymous
version is available as scientic use le, in which regional information, nationality and industry are
provided at a more aggregated level. The analysis in this paper is based on a weakly anonymous
version.
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Table B1: Average Monthly Expenditures and Program Durations
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
(a) Average monthly expenditures (in e)
Short-term training 602 580 570 658 538 421
Long-term training 1,570 1,627 1,668 1,686 1,555 1,574
 subsistence allowance 1,093 1,152 1,178 1,188 1,156 1,150
 training costs 629 640 664 681 631 627
Unemployment benets 1,132 1,160 1,189 1,185 1,261 1,313
Unemployment assistance 869 753 721 727 691 713
(b) Average program duration (in months)
Short-term training 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9
Long-term training 8.4 8.2 9.3 9.1 10.5 10.7
Notes: Panel (a) contains the average monthly expenditures per participant/benet recipient,
panel (b) the average program duration in months. Expenditures on subsistence allowance, un-
employment benets and unemployment assistance include social security contributions. Source:
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (2000, 2001b, 2002, 2003b), Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2004, 2005b,
2005c); own calculations.
ject to social security contributions or have been registered as a benet recipient,
job-seeker, or program participant at an employment agency.
The Employment History and the Benet Recipient History cover the time period
January 1990 to December 2004 (employment) and June 2005 (benets), respec-
tively. The Employment History records employment spells subject to social secu-
rity contributions as well as marginal part-time employment partly exempted from
social security contributions. Approximately 80% of all employed persons in West
Germany hold jobs that pay social security contributions (Bender et al. 2000, p.
651). We calculate the individual entitlement periods to unemployment benets
using the Employment History and the Benet Recipient History and a summary
of the dierent regulations provided by Plaÿmann (2002). The Program Partici-
pation History records active labor market programs starting in the period 2000
to mid-2005 and partly also those taking place in earlier years. Comparing the
entries into dierent programs in 1999 with the gures for later years shows that
information on programs starting in 1999 seems to be already complete for most
active labor market programs. We use information on the planned end dates of
training programs from this database. About 7% of the long-term training spells
and 25% of the short-term training spells have missing or implausible planned end
dates. In these cases, we impute a planned end date based on the median planned
duration within disaggregated, ve-digit program codes. The Job-Seeker Database
completely records job search spells starting between January 2000 and June 2005
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and partly also those beginning before 2000 if the person in question keeps the same
client number throughout.
The data are constructed as an event history data set with start and end dates
measured on a daily basis. An important feature of the data set is that it contains
multiple parallel spells in the case of concurrent events. This allows us e.g. to
distinguish regular employment from subsidized employment in the context of active
labor market policy. Moreover, the IEB comprises a large set of variables that
provide detailed information on socioeconomic, occupational and job characteristics,
as well as of job search and contents of active labor market programs.
D Detailed Descriptive Analysis
D.1 Descriptive Evidence on Outcomes with and without
Training
Figure D1 shows Kaplan-Meier estimates of the probability to survive in unemploy-
ment and employment beyond the number of days in unemployment and employ-
ment, respectively, given on the abscissa separately by treatment status. These
estimates do not correct for selective training participation or employment take up.
Treatment status during unemployment is a time-varying variable, which means
that future participants contribute to the nontreated survivor function until they
start training. In panel (a) of gure D1, we see that the curve for the treated with
long-term training lies above the one for the non-treated and that the area between
the two lines has the shape of a lens. This suggests that, initially, people enrolling
into long-term training leave unemployment at a slower rate than nontreated indi-
viduals, which is reected in a widening of the vertical distance between the two
curves. As the share of treated who have completed their training program increases
with elapsed unemployment duration the vertical distance between the dotted and
the solid curve eventually narrows again, implying that treated persons now leave
unemployment at a faster rate than non-treated. For short-term training there is no
evidence of such a lock-in eect during program participation. Even at short elapsed
unemployment durations the survivor functions of participants in short-term train-
ing and nontreated presons are very close. At higher elapsed durations, the fraction
of treated with short-term training still unemployed is clearly smaller than that of
nontreated or that of treated with long-term training.
Panel (b) of gure D1 shows the survivor functions in employment by treatment
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Figure D1: Probability of Survival in Unemployment and Employment
(a) Unemployment (b) Employment
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the probability to remain unemployed and employed,
respectively, beyond the number of days given on the abscissae. During unemployment, treatment
status varies with time, i.e. future participants contribute to the nontreated survivor function until
they start training. Calculations are based on 87,250 unemployment spells and 56,758 employment
spells, respectively.
status in the preceding unemployment spell. At short elapsed durations, individuals
treated with short-term training exit employment at a faster rate than nontreated
or former participants in long-term training. The latter have the most stable em-
ployment relationships. In fact, the vertical distance to the survivor functions of
persons treated with short-term training and nontreated rst increases and then
remains largely stable at higher elapsed durations.
D.2 Variation of Training Starts with Time
In the timing-of-events approach we trace out treatment eects by comparing indi-
viduals with the same elapsed unemployment duration but dierent training starts.
Somebody who has not yet enrolled in training serves as a control for somebody
who has already started training. The framework relies thus strongly on variation
of training starts with time. The institutional setup places no restrictions on when
programs should start in the calendar year. It also places no restrictions on the
point in time during unemployment. Figure D2 shows the density of training starts
over the calender year. We notice a short dip at Christmas and a reduced number
of program starts in June/July but in general training programs start on all days
throughout the year. Figure D3 displays the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the proba-
bility to start a program after some given time in open unemployment. The unit of
measurement is a calendar day. It can be seen that the hazard rate into short-term
training varies between 0.015 and 0.056% and that of long-term training lies between
10
0.003 and 0.037%.
Figure D2: Density of Program Starts throughout the Year
(a) Short-Term Training (b) Long-Term Training
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Notes: The bandwidth for the kernel smooth of the density is 10 days. Calculations are based on
8,279 and 5,580 starts of short-term and long-term training, respectively.
Figure D3: Hazard Rate into Training Programs
(a) Short-Term Training (b) Long-Term Training
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the probability to start training within a short period of
time conditional on unemployment lasting until the number of days given on the abscissae. The
bandwidth for the kernel smooth of the hazard rate is 30 days. Boundary estimates within 30 days
of the endpoints are omitted. Calculations are based on 87,250 unemployment spells.
Table D1 presents descriptive statistics on the elapsed unemployment duration at
training start and the planned durations of short-term and long-term training, re-
spectively. The majority of training starts occurs within the rst four months of
unemployment, i.e. the median waiting time is 140 for either training program. The
distribution of training starts is highly dispersed and right skewed with a mean
waiting time of around 200 days for both short-term and long-term training and
standard deviations of 261 days for short-term training and 193 days for long-term
training. Table D1 also shows the distribution of planned program durations. The
planned program duration is assigned at the start of the program and may dier
from ex post realized duration. The median duration of short-term training is four
11
weeks while for long-term training it is 6.5 months.
Table D1: Distribution of Training Starts and Planned Program Duration
Mean (SD) P25 P50 P75
Short-Term Training
Waiting time 228.72 (260.90) 52 140 304
Program duration 32.89 (26.46) 12 26 54
Long-Term Training
Waiting time 197.18 (192.49) 60 142 277
Program duration 312.44 (250.54) 176 201 362
Notes: Calculations are based on 8,279 starts of short-term training and 5,580 starts of long-
term training. Durations are measured in days. Program duration refers to the planned program
duration assigned at the start of training. It may dier from the ex post realized training duration.
SD denotes the standard deviation. P25, P50, P75 refer to the 25th, 50th, 75th percentile of the
cumulative distribution function.
D.3 Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables
Table D2: Means and Standard Deviations
Variable Description No Training Short Training Long Training
Demographics
Female 0.398 (0.489) 0.432 (0.495) 0.467 (0.499)
Foreign 0.388 (0.487) 0.358 (0.479) 0.312 (0.463)
Ethnic German 0.025 (0.157) 0.021 (0.142) 0.033 (0.178)
Has children 0.343 (0.475) 0.351 (0.477) 0.367 (0.482)
Age 37.609 (8.007) 39.455 (8.133) 39.061 (7.547)
Family status not available (na) 0.121 (0.326) 0.105 (0.307) 0.096 (0.295)
Single 0.348 (0.476) 0.368 (0.482) 0.349 (0.477)
Cohabitating 0.035 (0.184) 0.043 (0.202) 0.041 (0.199)
Lone parent 0.039 (0.193) 0.058 (0.234) 0.069 (0.253)
Married 0.457 (0.498) 0.426 (0.495) 0.445 (0.497)
Entitlement to Unemployment Benets
Has claim 0.902 (0.297) 0.912 (0.284) 0.937 (0.243)
Total claim (in 30 days) 11.518 (4.637) 12.028 (4.906) 11.569 (4.402)
Formal Education and Occupation in Last Job
School degree na 0.015 (0.123) 0.012 (0.109) 0.027 (0.163)
No school degree 0.105 (0.306) 0.120 (0.325) 0.078 (0.267)
Haupt-/Realschule (grade 9-10) 0.717 (0.451) 0.712 (0.453) 0.692 (0.462)
(Fach-)Abitur (grade 12-13) 0.163 (0.369) 0.156 (0.363) 0.204 (0.403)
Vocational degree na 0.015 (0.120) 0.010 (0.102) 0.024 (0.154)
No vocational degree 0.335 (0.472) 0.381 (0.486) 0.336 (0.473)
Apprenticeship degree 0.588 (0.492) 0.551 (0.497) 0.574 (0.495)
<continued on next page>
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Table D2: Means and Standard Deviations <continued>
Variable Description No Training Short Training Long Training
University degree 0.062 (0.242) 0.057 (0.233) 0.065 (0.247)
Occupation na 0.005 (0.068) 0.003 (0.054) 0.005 (0.068)
Elementary occupations 0.149 (0.356) 0.166 (0.373) 0.142 (0.349)
Agricultural occupations 0.028 (0.164) 0.019 (0.137) 0.016 (0.126)
Plant/machine operator 0.116 (0.320) 0.113 (0.316) 0.117 (0.321)
Craft and related workers 0.228 (0.420) 0.198 (0.399) 0.154 (0.361)
Service/sales worker 0.149 (0.356) 0.149 (0.356) 0.133 (0.339)
Clerk 0.141 (0.348) 0.178 (0.383) 0.234 (0.423)
Techn., assoc. professional 0.096 (0.294) 0.100 (0.299) 0.112 (0.316)
Professional 0.073 (0.261) 0.059 (0.235) 0.075 (0.263)
Senior ocial, manager 0.017 (0.128) 0.015 (0.121) 0.013 (0.114)
Caseworker's Assessment
Skill level in target job na 0.062 (0.242) 0.033 (0.180) 0.075 (0.264)
Unskilled in target job 0.398 (0.489) 0.452 (0.498) 0.398 (0.490)
Medium skills in target job 0.467 (0.499) 0.444 (0.497) 0.454 (0.498)
High skills in target job 0.073 (0.260) 0.071 (0.256) 0.072 (0.258)
Experienced in target job 0.894 (0.308) 0.914 (0.280) 0.874 (0.332)
Health status na 0.051 (0.221) 0.017 (0.129) 0.035 (0.185)
No health constraints 0.828 (0.377) 0.830 (0.375) 0.828 (0.377)
Health constr. without consequ. 0.059 (0.236) 0.074 (0.261) 0.068 (0.252)
Health constraints with conse-
quences for placement
0.061 (0.240) 0.079 (0.270) 0.068 (0.252)
Observations 37,529 3,827 4,103
Notes: All variables are dummies except age and total claim. All variables refer to the start of
the rst unemployment spell. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Long-term training includes
people who rst participate in short-term training.
E List of Variables Used in the Estimation
Table E1: Variable Denitions
Name Denition
bhazXX time-varying dummy equal to one if elapsed duration (in days)
is greater than XX days and smaller than or equal the number of
days referring to the next time interval dummy; the last interval
is open ended
f_bhazXX,
fo_bhazXX,
c_bhazXX
baseline hazard dummy interacted with female, foreign, indica-
tor for repeated cycle, respectively
female dummy equal to one if female
foreign dummy equal to one if citizenship is not German
<continued on next page>
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Table E1: Variable Denitions <continued>
Name Denition
ethnicgerman dummy equal to one if ethnic German, i.e. returned settler from
former German settlements
agegroup age in 6 categories: 1 25-29 years, 2 30-34 years, 3 35-39 years,
4 40-44 years, 5 45-49 years, 6 50 or older; time-varying
age, agesq age divided by ten, age squared divided by 100, centered around
38 years, time-varying
f_age, f_agesq age, agesq interacted with female
education 1 no information available, 2 no degree, 3 vocational training
degree, 4 university or technical college degree
schooling 1 no information available, 2 no schooling degree, 3 Hauptschu-
labschluss or Mittlere Reife/Fachoberschule (degrees reached af-
ter completion of the 9th or 10th grade), 4 Fachhochschulreife
or Abitur/Hochschulreife (degrees reached after completion of
the 12th or 13th grade)
health when unemployed with four categories: 1 no information avail-
able, 2 no health constraints mentioned, 3 health constraints,
but considered without consequences for placement, 4 health
constraints considered to have an impact on placement; when
employed dummy equal to one if person had health constraints
aecting placement within the last two months of job search
before start of employment spell
disabled dummy equal to one if disabled
family 1 no information available; 2 living alone; 3 not married, but
living together with at least one other person; 4 lone parent; 5
married
kids dummy equal to one if person has children
youngchild dummy equal to one if person has children younger than 10 years
occupation occupation (of last employment) in 10 categories: 1 no informa-
tion available, 2 elementary occupations, 3 agricultural occupa-
tions, 4 plant/machine operator, 5 craft and related workers, 6
service/sales workers, 7 clerk, 8 technicians and associate pro-
fessionals, 9 professionals, 10 senior ocials and managers
whitecollar dummy equal to one if white-collar job
bluecollar dummy equal to one if blue-collar job
parttime dummy equal to one if weekly hours worked less than full-time
lwquart1-lwquart4 dummy variables indicating the quartile of last salary
lnlwage, lnlwagesq log of last real salary and its square if salary is below social
security threshold, else zero
industry industry (of last employment) in 7 categories: 1 no information
available; 2 agriculture, forestry, shing; 3 manufacturing; 4
construction; 5 trade and transport; 6 nancial, renting and
business; 7 other services
seasonwork dummy equal to one if industry (of last employment) character-
ized by seasonal work
<continued on next page>
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Table E1: Variable Denitions <continued>
Name Denition
endlastjob 1 other reason and no information available, 2 termination of last
employment by employer, 3 by employee, 4 xed term contract
prevtrans dummy equal to one if received some kind of unemployment
insurance benets in the three years preceding the current un-
employment spell
earlycontact dummy equal to one if already registered as job-seeker up to
three months before beginning of current unemployment spell
taredu 1 no information available, 2 caseworker considers job-seeker as
low skilled in target profession, 3 considered as medium skilled,
4 considered as high skilled
tarexp dummy equal to one if caseworker considers job-seeker to have
professional experience in target profession
seekpt dummy equal to one if seeking only parttime job
sick time-varying dummy equal to one if temporarily sick (unem-
ployment spells only)
eversick time-varying (time-constant in employment spells) dummy
equal to one if experienced a period of sickness during the cur-
rent or past unemployment spell
oben time-varying dummy equal to one if temporarily o unemploy-
ment transfers because of sanctions (unemployment spells only)
eversanction time-varying (time-constant in employment spells) dummy
equal to one if received punitive benet sanction during the
current unemployment or past unemployment spell
hasclaim time-varying dummy equal to one if entitled to unemployment
benets and claim not yet expired (unemployment spells only)
totclaim, totclaimsq time-varying variable (time-constant in employment spells),
(square of) total entitlement period for unemployment benets
in 30 days, during unemployment zero if claim expired, centered
around twelve months
ubendXX time-varying dummy equal to one if the number of days until
expiration of the unemployment claim is smaller or equal to
XX days and larger than the number of days referring to the
next interval dummy or greater than zero in the last interval
(unemployment spells only)
land 10 categories indicating the West German Bundesländer (place
of residence): 1 SH, 2 HH, 3 NI, 4 HB, 5 NW, 6 HE, 7 RP, 8
BW, 9 BY, 10 SL
area West German Bundesländer aggregated into 4 categories (place
of residence): 1 SH, NI, HB, HH; 2 NW, 3 HE, RP, SL; 4 BY,
BW
<continued on next page>
15
Table E1: Variable Denitions <continued>
Name Denition
rtyp classication of the districts of residence according to their lo-
cal labor market conditions into 5 groups: 1 regions with very
bad labor market conditions (applies to East Germany only),
2 metropolitan areas with high unemployment, 3 regions with
medium unemployment, 4 metropolitan areas with very good la-
bor market conditions, 5 non-metropolitan areas with very good
labor market conditions
q1, q2, q3, q4 dummy equal to one if spell starts in the rst, second, third,
fourth quarter of the year
y1999-y2004 year of starting date of spell
cy2000-cy2001,
cy200220032004
time-varying dummies indicating the current calender year
season1-season4 time-varying dummies indicating the current calender quarter
lnduruelag, lnduru-
elagsq
(square of) log duration of last unemployment spell (employ-
ment spells only)
longue6, longue12 dummy equal to one if duration of last unemployment spell ex-
ceeds six and twelve months, respectively (earnings only)
cycle2, cycle3 dummies indicating second and higher order (third or more)
unemployment-employment cycles per person, respectively
dstlag, dstlag2 dummy indicating lagged participation in short-term training
during the last (before the last) unemployment-employment cy-
cle
dltlag, dltlag2 dummy indicating lagged participation in short-term training
during the last (before the last) unemployment-employment cy-
cle
pst time-varying dummy equal to one if participation in short-term
training has started (unemployment spells only)
stend_XX time-varying dummy variable equal to one if the number of days
until scheduled program end of short-term training is smaller or
equal to XX days and larger than the number of days referring to
the next interval dummy; the last interval ends at the scheduled
completion date (unemployment spells only)
stendXX time-varying dummy variable equal to one if the number of days
after scheduled program completion of short-term training is
greater or equal to XX days and smaller than the number of
days referring to the next interval dummy; the last interval is
open ended (unemployment spells only)
plt time-varying dummy equal to one if participation in long-term
training has started (unemployment spells only)
ltend_XX time-varying dummy variable equal to one if the number of days
until scheduled program end of long-term training is smaller or
equal to XX days and larger than the number of days referring to
the next interval dummy; the last interval ends at the scheduled
completion date (unemployment spells only)
<continued on next page>
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Table E1: Variable Denitions <continued>
Name Denition
ltendXX time-varying dummy variable equal to one if the number of
days after scheduled program completion of long-term training
is greater or equal to XX days and smaller than the number of
days referring to the next interval dummy; the last interval is
open ended (unemployment spells only)
lntst, lntstsq time-varying, (square of) log of days unemployed at start of
short-term training, positive if program has started otherwise
zero, centered around 110 days (unemployment spells only)
lntlt, lntltsq time-varying, (square of) log of days unemployed at start of
long-term training, positive if program has started otherwise
zero, centered around 110 days (unemployment spells only)
dst dummy equal to one if participated in short-term training during
previous unemployment spell (employment spells only)
dlt dummy equal to one if participated in long-term training during
previous unemployment spell (employment spells only)
Notes: If not noted otherwise, variables are time constant and refer to the start of a spell. In
unemployment spells, job characteristics refer to the previous employment. Descriptions of addi-
tional interaction terms and aggregated categories are omitted if the content can be inferred from
the variable name and the context. For example the variable industry67 is equal to one if industry
is either category 6 or 7. Variable names starting with f_ (fo_) indicate an interaction with the
dummy female (foreign).
F Detailed Estimation Results
Table F1: Estimated Coecients
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
Unemployment to Employment
bhaz27 1.868 (0.034) 2.120 (0.031)
f_bhaz27 0.388 (0.043)
fo_bhaz27 -0.271 (0.046)
bhaz32 1.087 (0.033) 1.051 (0.037)
bhaz40 1.411 (0.033) 1.417 (0.040)
f_bhaz40 0.198 (0.043)
fo_bhaz40 -0.213 (0.048)
bhaz48 1.133 (0.039) 0.936 (0.039)
f_bhaz48 -0.119 (0.052)
fo_bhaz48 -0.086 (0.047)
bhaz58 1.957 (0.033) 1.921 (0.032)
f_bhaz58 0.213 (0.038)
fo_bhaz58 -0.294 (0.042)
bhaz65 1.592 (0.030) 1.138 (0.030)
f_bhaz65 -0.325 (0.038)
<continued on next page>
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
fo_bhaz65 -0.317 (0.037)
bhaz85 2.214 (0.032) 1.852 (0.033)
f_bhaz85 -0.063 (0.038)
fo_bhaz85 -0.486 (0.040)
bhaz94 1.794 (0.032) 1.190 (0.035)
f_bhaz94 -0.452 (0.047)
fo_bhaz94 -0.399 (0.041)
bhaz110 1.927 (0.035) 1.436 (0.034)
f_bhaz110 -0.089 (0.039)
fo_bhaz110 -0.392 (0.041)
bhaz124 1.543 (0.036) 0.980 (0.039)
f_bhaz124 -0.314 (0.047)
fo_bhaz124 -0.288 (0.042)
bhaz144 1.554 (0.033) 1.143 (0.038)
fo_bhaz144 -0.234 (0.040)
bhaz166 1.488 (0.037) 1.139 (0.039)
f_bhaz166 0.091 (0.045)
fo_bhaz166 -0.217 (0.043)
bhaz184 1.129 (0.041) 0.766 (0.039)
f_bhaz184 -0.058 (0.043)
fo_bhaz184 -0.089 (0.048)
bhaz214 0.893 (0.027) 0.591 (0.035)
bhaz306 0.713 (0.040) 0.342 (0.049)
fo_bhaz306 -0.130 (0.051)
bhaz366 0.418 (0.045) 0.175 (0.043)
f_bhaz366 0.161 (0.049)
fo_bhaz366 -0.071 (0.051)
bhaz470 0.240 (0.050) -0.138 (0.051)
f_bhaz470 0.096 (0.054)
fo_bhaz470 -0.120 (0.053)
bhaz622 -0.176 (0.044) -0.668 (0.049)
f_bhaz622 0.212 (0.064)
bhaz955 -0.594 (0.055)
female 0.088 (0.052) -0.023 (0.061)
foreign 0.058 (0.021) -0.139 (0.018)
ethnicgerman 0.117 (0.032) 0.101 (0.039)
agegroup2 -0.080 (0.016) -0.087 (0.018)
agegroup3 -0.156 (0.017) -0.151 (0.020)
agegroup4 -0.249 (0.020) -0.268 (0.024)
agegroup5 -0.318 (0.021) -0.342 (0.024)
agegroup6 -0.455 (0.027) -0.550 (0.037)
f_agegroup4 0.075 (0.029) 0.084 (0.034)
f_agegroup6 -0.138 (0.039) -0.154 (0.046)
<continued on next page>
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
schooling3 0.101 (0.019) 0.087 (0.023)
schooling4 0.100 (0.026) 0.050 (0.032)
education3 0.154 (0.017) 0.151 (0.021)
education4 0.155 (0.032) 0.186 (0.038)
f_education34 -0.055 (0.024) -0.072 (0.029)
kids 0.076 (0.017) 0.080 (0.021)
f_youngchild -0.341 (0.029) -0.353 (0.032)
f_kids -0.088 (0.027) -0.142 (0.035)
family3 -0.065 (0.026) -0.060 (0.035)
family4 -0.036 (0.028) -0.019 (0.037)
family5 0.012 (0.014) -0.027 (0.017)
health3 -0.375 (0.023) -0.401 (0.030)
health4 -0.567 (0.025) -0.606 (0.032)
disabled -0.031 (0.007) -0.030 (0.008)
taredu3 0.070 (0.014) 0.078 (0.016)
tarexp -0.091 (0.017) -0.150 (0.022)
prevtrans 0.159 (0.012) 0.122 (0.014)
endlastjob3 -0.101 (0.024) -0.084 (0.024)
endlastjob4 0.071 (0.014) 0.040 (0.019)
seasonwork 0.302 (0.024) 0.240 (0.027)
whitecollar -0.140 (0.029) -0.101 (0.030)
bluecollar -0.033 (0.028) -0.017 (0.031)
parttime -0.124 (0.028) -0.135 (0.028)
lwquart2 0.071 (0.017) 0.061 (0.021)
lwquart3 0.148 (0.018) 0.124 (0.022)
lwquart4 0.270 (0.020) 0.226 (0.024)
occupation2 0.141 (0.077) 0.054 (0.101)
occupation3 0.547 (0.084) 0.347 (0.107)
occupation4 0.342 (0.078) 0.254 (0.104)
occupation5 0.310 (0.078) 0.210 (0.102)
occupation6 0.209 (0.078) 0.150 (0.102)
occupation7 0.107 (0.081) 0.046 (0.101)
occupation8 0.150 (0.080) 0.101 (0.103)
occupation9 0.232 (0.082) 0.163 (0.103)
occupation10 0.072 (0.090) 0.042 (0.110)
f_occupation4 -0.298 (0.041) -0.330 (0.050)
f_occupation5 -0.209 (0.042) -0.221 (0.055)
f_occupation8 -0.024 (0.037) -0.020 (0.041)
fo_occupation3 -0.323 (0.058) -0.301 (0.079)
industry2 -0.598 (0.183) -0.003 (0.301)
industry3 -0.734 (0.178) -0.204 (0.291)
industry4 -0.412 (0.178) 0.083 (0.294)
industry5 -0.589 (0.178) -0.108 (0.293)
<continued on next page>
19
Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
industry67 -0.671 (0.177) -0.213 (0.292)
f_industry3 0.123 (0.052) 0.149 (0.064)
f_industry56 0.112 (0.047) 0.221 (0.056)
f_industry7 0.194 (0.050) 0.278 (0.057)
fo_industry4 -0.109 (0.025) -0.114 (0.032)
fo_industry6 0.136 (0.026) 0.159 (0.032)
hasclaim -0.046 (0.015) -0.073 (0.019)
ubend60 0.174 (0.025) 0.206 (0.038)
ubend30 0.349 (0.027) 0.368 (0.039)
totclaim 0.065 (0.006) 0.080 (0.008)
totclaimsq -0.002 (0.000) -0.003 (0.000)
sick -2.265 (0.126) -2.270 (0.171)
eversick -0.149 (0.024) -0.117 (0.029)
land5 -0.127 (0.014) -0.090 (0.016)
land8 -0.007 (0.020) 0.027 (0.022)
land9 0.246 (0.014) 0.244 (0.017)
land10 -0.178 (0.044) -0.195 (0.053)
rtyp2 -0.131 (0.018) -0.151 (0.019)
rtyp5 0.144 (0.014) 0.139 (0.016)
season2 0.372 (0.012) 0.252 (0.014)
season3 0.194 (0.013) 0.124 (0.017)
season4 -0.272 (0.014) -0.255 (0.017)
y1999q4 0.047 (0.025) 0.087 (0.027)
y2000q1 0.044 (0.026) 0.090 (0.027)
y2000q2 -0.127 (0.030) -0.115 (0.029)
y2000q3 -0.095 (0.030) -0.091 (0.029)
y2000q4 -0.148 (0.027) -0.123 (0.029)
y2001q1 -0.174 (0.025) -0.135 (0.028)
y2001q2 -0.358 (0.029) -0.297 (0.032)
y2001q3 -0.337 (0.027) -0.263 (0.031)
y2001q4 -0.377 (0.025) -0.248 (0.030)
y2002q1 -0.415 (0.034)
y2002q2 -0.794 (0.043)
y2002q3 -0.710 (0.039)
y2002q4 -0.601 (0.032)
y2003q1 -0.583 (0.037)
y2003q2 -0.969 (0.045)
y2003q3 -0.769 (0.043)
y2003q4 -0.685 (0.037)
y2004q1 -0.702 (0.038)
y2004q2 -1.039 (0.058)
y2004q3 -1.073 (0.058)
y2004q4 -1.604 (0.096)
<continued on next page>
20
Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
cycle2 0.192 (0.016)
cycle3 0.458 (0.021)
dstlag -0.175 (0.034)
dstlag2 -0.055 (0.063)
dltlag -0.120 (0.047)
dltlag2 -0.171 (0.072)
pst 0.057 (0.123) 0.324 (0.242)
stend_16 -1.175 (0.074) -1.125 (0.098)
stend_15 -0.202 (0.058) -0.214 (0.080)
stend31 -0.592 (0.044) -0.610 (0.067)
stend361 -0.789 (0.069) -0.904 (0.101)
f_stend31 0.186 (0.072) 0.287 (0.091)
f_stend361 0.179 (0.110) 0.301 (0.137)
lntst -0.006 (0.055) 0.135 (0.079)
lntstsq 0.009 (0.007) -0.011 (0.010)
pst_female -0.113 (0.057) -0.048 (0.068)
pst_foreign 0.020 (0.038) 0.111 (0.051)
pst_disabled 0.089 (0.041) 0.068 (0.039)
pst_health3 0.075 (0.064) -0.103 (0.093)
pst_health4 0.332 (0.078) 0.353 (0.097)
pst_age 0.370 (0.212) 0.253 (0.282)
pst_agesq -0.055 (0.026) -0.038 (0.036)
pst_occupation2 0.400 (0.122) 0.480 (0.182)
pst_occupation45 0.442 (0.121) 0.527 (0.171)
pst_occupation6 0.367 (0.125) 0.458 (0.181)
pst_occupation9 0.261 (0.141) 0.203 (0.190)
pst_occupation7810 0.460 (0.118) 0.476 (0.175)
plt 0.544 (0.072) 1.751 (0.177)
ltend_361 -3.227 (0.124) -4.373 (0.194)
ltend_360 -2.654 (0.100) -3.743 (0.168)
ltend_180 -2.173 (0.086) -3.110 (0.145)
ltend_90 -1.511 (0.081) -2.164 (0.124)
ltend_30 -0.513 (0.059) -0.934 (0.100)
ltend91 -0.174 (0.058) 0.078 (0.083)
ltend181 -0.366 (0.064) 0.012 (0.101)
ltend361 -0.468 (0.090) -0.107 (0.139)
ltend541 -0.326 (0.097) -0.119 (0.129)
fo_ltend_180 0.301 (0.145) 0.515 (0.163)
fo_ltend_90 0.305 (0.136) 0.424 (0.148)
lntlt -0.059 (0.052) 0.165 (0.081)
lntltsq 0.015 (0.007) -0.029 (0.012)
plt_female 0.056 (0.049) 0.190 (0.065)
plt_foreign -0.078 (0.065) 0.062 (0.090)
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
plt_disabled 0.034 (0.021) 0.034 (0.027)
plt_health3 0.123 (0.083) 0.151 (0.118)
plt_health4 0.255 (0.082) 0.219 (0.135)
plt_sick -0.901 (1.003) -0.521 (1.027)
plt_eversick 0.090 (0.073) 0.021 (0.101)
plt_age 0.988 (0.255) 1.049 (0.412)
plt_agesq -0.135 (0.033) -0.147 (0.053)
plt_education3 -0.236 (0.050) -0.272 (0.079)
plt_foeducation3 0.106 (0.089) 0.274 (0.122)
plt_foeducation4 -0.328 (0.195) -0.361 (0.320)
plt_occupation45 -0.052 (0.050) -0.006 (0.082)
plt_occupation78910 0.099 (0.049) 0.017 (0.074)
Intercept -6.269 (0.196) -6.841 (0.304)
Unemployment to Short-Term Training
bhaz17 -0.227 (0.055) -0.149 (0.072)
fo_bhaz17 0.229 (0.108)
bhaz37 -0.515 (0.068) -0.291 (0.068)
f_bhaz37 0.239 (0.082)
fo_bhaz37 0.402 (0.110)
bhaz66 -0.428 (0.070) -0.216 (0.073)
f_bhaz66 0.195 (0.079)
fo_bhaz66 0.327 (0.105)
bhaz99 -0.335 (0.063) -0.177 (0.074)
fo_bhaz99 0.335 (0.111)
bhaz140 -0.425 (0.056) -0.155 (0.064)
fo_bhaz140 0.349 (0.088)
c_bhaz140 0.215 (0.052)
bhaz568 -0.701 (0.092) -0.329 (0.087)
f_bhaz568 -0.184 (0.083)
fo_bhaz568 0.393 (0.112)
c_bhaz568 0.481 (0.079)
female -0.066 (0.032) -0.027 (0.039)
foreign -0.520 (0.088) -0.286 (0.054)
agegroup2 -0.012 (0.039) -0.017 (0.052)
agegroup3 -0.038 (0.040) -0.008 (0.054)
agegroup4 -0.114 (0.040) -0.007 (0.058)
agegroup5 -0.218 (0.041) -0.140 (0.059)
agegroup6 -0.663 (0.053) -0.566 (0.076)
fo_schooling3 0.089 (0.043) 0.133 (0.055)
education23 -0.338 (0.177) -0.732 (0.204)
education4 -0.392 (0.188) -0.664 (0.212)
family4 0.195 (0.049) 0.210 (0.064)
family5 -0.153 (0.025) -0.182 (0.035)
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
health3 -0.075 (0.044) -0.126 (0.060)
health4 -0.174 (0.045) -0.199 (0.056)
disabled 0.125 (0.027) 0.137 (0.031)
seekpt -0.196 (0.045) -0.209 (0.052)
taredu3 0.078 (0.027) 0.006 (0.035)
taredu4 0.148 (0.078) 0.131 (0.095)
tarexp -0.029 (0.038) 0.050 (0.058)
earlycontact 0.142 (0.026) 0.125 (0.037)
seasonwork -0.141 (0.041) -0.088 (0.061)
lwquart2 0.068 (0.036) 0.043 (0.050)
lwquart3 0.138 (0.035) 0.118 (0.051)
lwquart4 -0.044 (0.038) -0.009 (0.053)
occupation3 -0.093 (0.085) -0.022 (0.126)
occupation4 -0.025 (0.044) 0.008 (0.055)
occupation5 -0.006 (0.041) 0.062 (0.056)
occupation6 0.102 (0.043) 0.128 (0.064)
occupation7 0.141 (0.043) 0.196 (0.055)
occupation8 0.094 (0.049) 0.103 (0.067)
occupation9 -0.078 (0.095) -0.186 (0.129)
occupation10 -0.330 (0.137) -0.203 (0.165)
f_occupation9 0.133 (0.103) 0.032 (0.137)
f_occupation10 0.449 (0.239) 0.443 (0.273)
industry3 0.279 (0.043) 0.313 (0.062)
industry5 0.216 (0.046) 0.261 (0.063)
industry6 0.213 (0.046) 0.339 (0.070)
industry7 0.085 (0.049) 0.221 (0.070)
f_industry4 0.222 (0.139) 0.362 (0.153)
hasclaim 0.188 (0.028) 0.195 (0.040)
totclaim 0.027 (0.013) 0.058 (0.019)
totclaimsq -0 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001)
sick -0.191 (0.097) -0.139 (0.152)
eversick 0.107 (0.044) 0.028 (0.060)
oben -0.145 (0.145) -0.081 (0.192)
eversanc 0.370 (0.066) 0.409 (0.104)
rtyp3 -0.061 (0.031) -0.110 (0.041)
rtyp4 -0.177 (0.045) -0.266 (0.054)
rtyp5 -0.108 (0.035) -0.100 (0.047)
cy2000 0.838 (0.099)
cy2001 0.949 (0.106)
cy200220032004 1.169 (0.117)
season2 0.286 (0.032) 0.145 (0.042)
season3 0.191 (0.036) -0.056 (0.043)
season4 -0.010 (0.033) -0.214 (0.045)
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
q2 0.067 (0.030) 0.008 (0.046)
q3 0.153 (0.027) 0.110 (0.037)
y20002001 0.029 (0.055) 0.403 (0.045)
y2002 0.195 (0.077)
y20032004 0.360 (0.077)
cycle2 -0.207 (0.044)
cycle3 -0.387 (0.057)
Intercept -8.032 (0.224) -7.295 (0.265)
Unemployment to Long-Term Training
bhaz78 0.055 (0.055) -0.035 (0.061)
bhaz114 0.253 (0.038) 0.191 (0.053)
bhaz336 0.361 (0.065) 0.380 (0.092)
bhaz428 -0.513 (0.062) -0.413 (0.099)
female -0.307 (0.098) -0.348 (0.136)
foreign -0.244 (0.038) -0.281 (0.049)
ethnicgerman 0.375 (0.081) 0.453 (0.111)
agegroup2 -0.073 (0.044) -0.105 (0.057)
agegroup34 -0.179 (0.043) -0.182 (0.054)
agegroup5 -0.445 (0.054) -0.451 (0.073)
agegroup6 -0.991 (0.064) -1.024 (0.081)
schooling2 -0.822 (0.173) -1.186 (0.234)
schooling3 -0.607 (0.172) -0.973 (0.229)
schooling4 -0.162 (0.183) -0.508 (0.230)
f_schooling3 0.332 (0.100) 0.378 (0.138)
f_schooling4 0.087 (0.118) 0.072 (0.162)
education2 -0.231 (0.178) -0.451 (0.230)
education3 -0.228 (0.176) -0.473 (0.225)
education4 -0.358 (0.194) -0.597 (0.253)
f_youngchild -0.157 (0.058) -0.163 (0.078)
family3 0.171 (0.065) 0.306 (0.099)
family4 0.469 (0.060) 0.582 (0.084)
family5 0.068 (0.032) 0.129 (0.042)
health4 -0.121 (0.052) -0.105 (0.082)
seekpt -0.356 (0.054) -0.404 (0.065)
taredu4 -0.125 (0.077) -0.219 (0.094)
tarexp -0.302 (0.043) -0.350 (0.064)
earlycontact 0.329 (0.032) 0.412 (0.039)
prevtrans -0.217 (0.029) -0.316 (0.040)
lwquart2 0.139 (0.049) 0.105 (0.070)
lwquart3 0.277 (0.064) 0.259 (0.096)
lwquart4 0.274 (0.093) 0.223 (0.131)
lnlwage 0.538 (0.118) 0.639 (0.170)
lnlwagesq -0.098 (0.023) -0.112 (0.034)
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
seasonwork -0.217 (0.057) -0.226 (0.081)
bluecollar -0.102 (0.043) -0.106 (0.059)
whitecollar 0.163 (0.039) 0.111 (0.055)
occupation2 0.173 (0.089) 0.153 (0.115)
occupation4 0.235 (0.093) 0.230 (0.118)
occupation5 0.127 (0.090) 0.079 (0.115)
occupation6 0.126 (0.088) 0.155 (0.114)
occupation7 0.488 (0.085) 0.588 (0.111)
occupation8 0.259 (0.088) 0.313 (0.112)
occupation9 0.169 (0.096) 0.253 (0.123)
industry3 0.117 (0.033) 0.138 (0.052)
industry4 -0.492 (0.061) -0.516 (0.088)
industry7 -0.262 (0.049) -0.295 (0.063)
f_industry4 0.514 (0.140) 0.513 (0.179)
fo_industry7 0.260 (0.080) 0.291 (0.104)
hasclaim 0.182 (0.044) 0.194 (0.059)
ubend120 0.103 (0.063) 0.055 (0.072)
ubend90 0.238 (0.063) 0.218 (0.074)
ubend60 0.084 (0.050) 0.089 (0.065)
oben -0.615 (0.205) -0.976 (0.336)
land2 0.275 (0.079) 0.346 (0.103)
land3 0.070 (0.045) 0.048 (0.059)
land6 0.043 (0.058) 0.122 (0.077)
land7 0.136 (0.063) 0.133 (0.086)
land8 0.091 (0.058) 0.222 (0.082)
land9 0.065 (0.046) 0.111 (0.068)
rtyp2 0.061 (0.047) 0.090 (0.061)
rtyp5 0.123 (0.041) 0.128 (0.058)
season23 -0.048 (0.030) -0.099 (0.037)
season4 -0.564 (0.040) -0.589 (0.049)
q3 -0.029 (0.035) 0.036 (0.050)
q4 -0.157 (0.035) -0.091 (0.046)
y2000 -0.074 (0.044) -0.015 (0.054)
y2001 -0.394 (0.046) -0.385 (0.056)
y2002 -0.964 (0.066)
y2003 -1.367 (0.078)
y2004 -1.625 (0.113)
pst 0.289 (0.042) 0.236 (0.056)
Intercept -7.285 (0.228) -6.462 (0.355)
Employment / Earnings
bhaz14 0.498 (0.027)
bhaz24 1.053 (0.023)
bhaz41 1.569 (0.027)
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
bhaz47 0.424 (0.025)
f_bhaz47 -0.205 (0.038)
bhaz49 1.941 (0.029)
bhaz56 2.529 (0.028)
bhaz72 3.197 (0.031)
bhaz89 0.431 (0.030)
fo_bhaz89 0.060 (0.036)
bhaz133 0.321 (0.028)
bhaz162 0.584 (0.031)
f_bhaz162 0.186 (0.045)
bhaz184 0.201 (0.037)
fo_bhaz184 0.096 (0.050)
bhaz212 0.625 (0.032)
fo_bhaz212 -0.204 (0.050)
bhaz236 1.117 (0.037)
f_bhaz236 -0.085 (0.050)
fo_bhaz236 -0.454 (0.052)
bhaz254 1.332 (0.039)
f_bhaz254 -0.569 (0.052)
fo_bhaz254 -0.592 (0.053)
bhaz274 1.805 (0.036)
f_bhaz274 -0.812 (0.059)
fo_bhaz274 -0.934 (0.058)
bhaz290 1.699 (0.037)
f_bhaz290 -0.727 (0.053)
fo_bhaz290 -0.996 (0.056)
bhaz311 1.007 (0.036)
f_bhaz311 -0.228 (0.042)
fo_bhaz311 -0.554 (0.050)
bhaz366 0.044 (0.049)
f_bhaz366 -0.105 (0.051)
fo_bhaz366 -0.112 (0.058)
bhaz441 -0.022 (0.043)
f_bhaz441 -0.110 (0.047)
fo_bhaz441 -0.107 (0.050)
bhaz580 0.228 (0.039)
f_bhaz580 -0.193 (0.045)
fo_bhaz580 -0.309 (0.051)
bhaz732 -0.326 (0.038)
fo_bhaz732 -0.236 (0.051)
bhaz992 -0.371 (0.035)
fo_bhaz992 -0.253 (0.050)
female -0.171 (0.040) 0.404 (0.023)
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
foreign 0.293 (0.035) 0.113 (0.016)
ethnicgerman -0.099 (0.034) 0.092 (0.040)
age -0.452 (0.086) -0.447 (0.109)
agesq 0.071 (0.011) 0.055 (0.014)
f_age -0.393 (0.150) 0.361 (0.171)
f_agesq 0.037 (0.019) -0.037 (0.022)
education2 0.171 (0.018) 0.356 (0.097)
education3 0.151 (0.095)
education4 -0.239 (0.055) -0.245 (0.099)
f_education3 -0.048 (0.024)
f_education4 0.221 (0.077)
schooling2 0.343 (0.064) 0.180 (0.093)
schooling3 0.278 (0.063) 0.109 (0.091)
schooling4 0.234 (0.074) -0.138 (0.093)
f_schooling4 0.059 (0.042)
fo_schooling3 0.050 (0.034)
fo_schooling4 0.078 (0.045)
kids -0.058 (0.015) -0.027 (0.017)
family3 0.065 (0.031) 0.079 (0.036)
family4 0.040 (0.032) 0.114 (0.038)
family5 -0.055 (0.015) -0.007 (0.017)
health 0.120 (0.018) 0.152 (0.023)
eversick 0.078 (0.028) 0.214 (0.029)
eversanc 0.168 (0.055)
lnlwage 0.022 (0.034)
lnlwagesq -0.009 (0.007)
lwquart2 -0.357 (0.024)
lwquart3 -0.074 (0.017) -0.777 (0.023)
lwquart4 -0.113 (0.023) -1.419 (0.028)
endlastjob2 0.046 (0.016)
endlastjob3 -0.082 (0.031)
endlastjob4 0.157 (0.020)
totclaim -0.014 (0.001)
bluecollar 0.151 (0.018) 0.261 (0.021)
occupation2 0.051 (0.040) 0.574 (0.043)
occupation3 0.557 (0.053)
occupation4 0.025 (0.043) 0.399 (0.041)
occupation5 0.063 (0.041) 0.400 (0.039)
occupation6 0.017 (0.046) 0.544 (0.039)
occupation7 -0.016 (0.045) 0.335 (0.038)
occupation8 -0.097 (0.049)
occupation9 -0.245 (0.066)
occupation10 -0.333 (0.083)
<continued on next page>
27
Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
occupation910 -0.273 (0.047)
f_occupation3 0.330 (0.064)
f_occupation4 0.101 (0.048)
f_occupation8 0.041 (0.045) 0.181 (0.042)
f_occupation9 0.195 (0.069)
f_occupation10 0.408 (0.133)
f_occupation910 0.295 (0.047)
fo_occupation8 -0.099 (0.051)
fo_occupation910 -0.101 (0.060)
seasonwork 0.339 (0.040)
industry2 -0.129 (0.052)
industry3 -0.140 (0.043)
industry4 0.808 (0.038)
industry5 -0.167 (0.036)
industry6 0.008 (0.037)
f_industry3 0.189 (0.043)
f_industry5 0.239 (0.034)
f_industry6 0.148 (0.040)
land1 0.123 (0.025) 0.190 (0.032)
land2 0.119 (0.036) 0.064 (0.042)
land3 0.073 (0.018) 0.153 (0.020)
land4 0.060 (0.052) 0.247 (0.062)
land6 -0.034 (0.023) 0.021 (0.024)
land8 -0.102 (0.020) -0.049 (0.024)
land9 0.063 (0.016) 0.011 (0.019)
season23 -0.452 (0.075)
season4 0.497 (0.030)
s2_seasonwork -0.621 (0.059)
s3_seasonwork -0.519 (0.053)
s4_seasonwork 0.179 (0.044)
s2_industry3 0.196 (0.080)
s2_industry4 -1.163 (0.088)
s2_industry567 0.287 (0.076)
s3_industry3 0.278 (0.082)
s3_industry4 -1.036 (0.086)
s3_industry5 0.347 (0.080)
s3_industry6 0.399 (0.078)
s3_industry7 0.573 (0.077)
s4_industry3 -0.062 (0.046)
s4_industry4 -0.805 (0.039)
s4_industry5 -0.050 (0.034)
s4_industry6 -0.224 (0.042)
q1 -0.131 (0.013)
<continued on next page>
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
q3 -0.068 (0.015)
y2000 -0.013 (0.033)
y2001 0.020 (0.033)
y2002 0.045 (0.036)
y2003 0.048 (0.038)
y2004q1 -0.032 (0.052)
y2004q2 0.178 (0.047)
y2004q3 0.357 (0.064)
y2004q4 0.325 (0.085)
cycle2 0.259 (0.015)
cycle3 0.513 (0.021)
lnduruelag 0.357 (0.062)
lnduruelagsq -0.034 (0.007)
longue6 0.235 (0.020)
longue12 0.207 (0.029)
dstlag -0.187 (0.042)
dltlag -0.211 (0.049)
dst 0.258 (0.063) 0.131 (0.048)
dst_female 0.045 (0.050) -0.200 (0.052)
dst_foreign -0.084 (0.048) -0.153 (0.058)
dst_ethnicgerman -0.305 (0.148) -0.209 (0.151)
dst_disabled -0.084 (0.043)
dst_health -0.095 (0.068)
dst_eversick 0.084 (0.067)
dst_schooling34 -0.170 (0.063)
dst_occupation67 -0.054 (0.055)
dst_occupation789 0.054 (0.057)
dlt 0.163 (0.071) -0.107 (0.127)
dlt_female -0.170 (0.084) -0.185 (0.054)
dlt_foreign 0.296 (0.102) -0.067 (0.057)
dlt_ethnicgerman 0.197 (0.136) -0.143 (0.143)
dlt_health 0.119 (0.075)
dlt_eversick 0.224 (0.091)
dlt_schooling4 -0.097 (0.080)
dlt_foschooling34 -0.137 (0.114)
dlt_education3 -0.157 (0.071)
dlt_feducation3 0.182 (0.111)
dlt_occupation910 0.226 (0.108)
dlt_occupation5 0.098 (0.075)
dlt_occupation789 0.283 (0.060)
dlt_longue6 -0.181 (0.096)
dlt_longue12 -0.176 (0.064)
Intercept -7.658 (0.171) -6.130 (0.081)
<continued on next page>
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Table F1: Estimated Coecients <continued>
Model 1 (Employment) Model 2 (Earnings)
Factor Loadings on First Latent Factor (w1)
Unemployment to
Employment
-0.779 (0.021) 0.044 (0.072)
Unemployed, treated
with short-term tr.
0.339 (0.085) -0.151 (0.215)
Unemployed, treated
with long-term tr.
0.307 (0.107) 0.136 (0.403)
Unem. to short-term
training
-0.185 (0.079) -0.057 (0.147)
Unem. to long-term
training
-0.112 (0.111) -0.502 (0.350)
Employment to unem-
ployment / earnings
0.127 (0.020) 0.669 (0.051)
Employed, treated
with short-term tr.
-0.106 (0.077)
Employed, treated
with long-term tr.
-0.253 (0.141)
Factor Loadings on Second Latent Factor (w2)
Unemployment to em-
ployment
-0.426 (0.020) 0.329 (0.051)
Unemployed, treated
with short-term tr.
0.110 (0.047) 0.076 (0.056)
Unemployed, treated
with long-term tr.
-0.109 (0.065) 0.917 (0.100)
Unem. to short-term
training
0 0
Unem. to long-term
training
0.036 (0.052) -1.114 (0.080)
Employment to unem-
ployment / earnings
0.773 (0.024) -0.073 (0.028)
Employed, treated
with short-term tr.
0.159 (0.044)
Employed, treated
with long-term tr.
0.224 (0.069)
Probabilities
Pr(w1 = 1) 0.904 (0.009)
 0.958 (0.009)
Pr(w2 = 1) 0.151 (0.010)
 0.787 (0.017)
Model Statistics
Log-Likelihood -232,678.02 -114,220.94
# Parameters 524 361
# Spells 318,508 166,567
# Individuals 45,459 45,459
Notes: Model 1 refers to the model with unemployment duration and employment duration as
outcomes, model 2 to the model with unemployment duration and daily earnings as outcomes.
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 250 replications are in parentheses. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%- level, respectively, assuming asymptotic normality of the
corresponding coecient. 30
G Model Fit
In order to assess the t of the estimated models, we simulate ten unemployment-
employment cycles for each person in the inow sample, each time assigning a new
draw from the unobserved heterogeneity distribution and a randomly drawn per-
centile of the duration distribution. The percentiles are drawn from a uniform
distribution on [0; 1). The unobserved heterogeneity terms are drawn from their
estimated distribution. In order to nd for each observation in the sample and for
a given percentile q the corresponding survival time t(q) = infft : S(t)  qg, with
S(t) the survivor function, we proceed as follows. First, we predict the survival
probability at the beginning, S(td), and the end, S(td), of each segment d of our
piecewise constant exponential model using the estimated coecients on the ob-
served variables and the randomly drawn value from the unobserved heterogeneity
distribution. Second, we determine the segment in which S(td) < 1   q  S(td).
Third, we compute the survival time t(q) = td  ln[(1  q)=S(td)]=d, where d is the
exponential hazard rate in the dth segment.
We rst simulate the waiting times until short-term training and long-term train-
ing, respectively. Then we assign each person a randomly drawn planned program
duration. We draw the planned program durations from the distribution of planned
program durations in our sample. Next, we calculate the survival time in unemploy-
ment conditional on the simulated starting date and length of training. Finally, we
compute the subsequent employment duration and daily earnings in an analogous
way, using the observations following simulated unemployment spells that end with
a transition to employment. Simulated waiting times until treatment as well as un-
employment and employment durations are censored at the end of the observation
period in the original data, i.e. December 31, 2004, and daily earnings at the social
security threshold in 2000, i.e. e144.
Figure G1 displays the simulated and original distributions for the model with em-
ployment duration as the second outcome and gure G2 the simulated and original
distributions for the model with daily earnings as the second outcome. The model
t is in general excellent. In regions in which there are many exits, actual and
simulated survivor functions nearly coincide. For the durations until employment
and until long-term training (panel (a) and (c)), respectively, the simulated survivor
functions slightly overestimate the exit probability at very long durations where the
actual probability of exit is extremely small and thus the survivor almost horizontal.
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Figure G1: Fit of the Model with Employment Duration as the Second Outcome
(a) Unemployment Duration (b) Duration until Short-Term Training
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(c) Duration until Long-Term Training (d) Employment Duration
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the survival probabilities are based on ten simulated
unemployment-employment cycles for each person in the sample.
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Figure G2: Fit of the Model with Daily Earnings as the Second Outcome
(a) Unemployment Duration (b) Duration until Short-Term Training
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(c) Duration until Long-Term Training (d) Daily Earnings
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the cumulative distribution functions are based on ten
simulated unemployment-employment cycles for each person in the sample.
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H Simulation of Treatment and Nontreatment Out-
comes
We obtain treatment eects by simulating treatment and nontreatment outcomes for
a subset of the originally treated persons in the data. Specically, we consider those
persons in our sample who start training within the rst 731 days of their rst un-
employment spell. We exclude later training starts in order to avoid extrapolations
beyond the time horizon of our data. We simulate ten unemployment-employment
cycles for each person, each time assigning a new draw from the unobserved hetero-
geneity distribution and a randomly drawn percentile of the duration distribution.
The simulation procedure is analogous to that outlined in section G except that we
take the original starting dates and planned program durations of training as given.
Thus, we rst simulate the unemployment spells and then the employment spells,
using those observations following simulated unemployment spells that end with a
transition to employment. When we simulate earnings we use the estimated coe-
cients from our alternative model with earnings as the second outcome to simulate
unemployment durations and daily earnings. We drop simulated observations for
which the simulated unemployment spell with training ends before the actual start
of training. In order to obtain the nontreatment outcomes we repeat the simulation
procedure with treatment eects set to zero and using the same random draws. We
compute standard errors by rerunning the simulation procedure 250 times using the
parameter values from the bootstrap replications.
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I Selected Tests for Treatment Eect Heterogeneity
Table I1: Wald Tests of Heterogeneous Treatment Eects for Model 1 (Employment)
2-Statistic df p-Value
Unemployment to Employment
Short-Term Training
Female 7.027 3 0.071
Foreign 0.269 1 0.604
Age 13.524 2 0.001
Occupation 23.124 5 0.000
Long-Term Training
Female 1.320 1 0.251
Foreign 13.566 5 0.019
Age 21.640 2 0.000
Education 30.006 3 0.000
Occupation 8.000 2 0.018
Employment to Unemployment
Short-Term Training
Female 0.827 1 0.363
Foreign 3.018 1 0.082
Occupation 0.991 1 0.320
Long-Term Training
Female 4.150 2 0.126
Foreign 13.605 2 0.001
Education 5.130 2 0.077
Occupation 4.409 1 0.036
Notes: The hypothesis tests refer to joint signicance tests on the corresponding estimated coe-
cients for model 1 in table F1. For instance, the test in the rst row labeled `Female' refers to the
coecients on the variables f_stend31, f_stend361 and pst_female in model 1. The column `2-
Statistic' shows the test statistic, column `df' the degrees of freedom, and `p-Value' the probability
value.
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Table I2: Wald Tests of Heterogeneous Treatment Eects for Model 2 (Earnings)
2-Statistic df p-Value
Unemployment to Employment
Short-Term Training
Female 16.713 3 0.001
Foreign 4.782 1 0.029
Age 2.818 2 0.244
Occupation 19.027 5 0.002
Long-Term Training
Female 8.562 1 0.003
Foreign 41.259 5 0.000
Age 11.108 2 0.004
Education 13.069 3 0.004
Occupation 0.094 2 0.954
Earnings
Short-Term Training
Female 15.095 1 0.000
Foreign 6.923 1 0.009
Occupation 0.896 1 0.344
Long-Term Training
Female 11.522 1 0.001
Foreign 1.382 1 0.240
Occupation 22.472 2 0.000
Notes: The hypothesis tests refer to joint signicance tests on the corresponding estimated coe-
cients for model 2 in table F1. For instance, the test in the rst row labeled `Female' corresponds
to the coecients on the variables f_stend31, f_stend361 and pst_female in model 2. The col-
umn `2-Statistic' shows the test statistic, column `df' the degrees of freedom, and `p-Value' the
probability value.
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